Essays in organisational economics by Nica, Melania
                   i  
 
 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Essays in Organisational Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Melania Nica 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Department of Economics of the 
London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy 
 
London, July 2014 
                   ii  
 
Declaration 
 
 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London 
School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have 
clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out 
jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full 
acknowledgement is made.  This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. 
 
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third 
party. 
 
 
I declare that my thesis consists of 25221 words.  
                   iii  
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis consists of three chapters. The first two chapters explore the effect of career concerns on 
communication by multiple experts. The third chapter addresses corporate governance as a double 
layered moral hazard.  
The first two chapters relate to a model where a decision maker acts over two periods on the advice of two 
imperfectly informed experts. Both experts are possibly biased, but in opposite directions. The decision 
maker can only rely on the experts' reports to determine a course of action, as he never observes the true 
state of the economy. I show that the experts may report in the opposite direction of their possible bias not 
only for reputational reasons, but also as a strategic response to the possibility of misreporting by their 
counterpart. This model also provides a new justification for conformity: an expert might send the same 
message as the other, not in order to look similar, but to distinguish herself. This is done by inviting 
comparison to the reliability of the other expert. I also show that a decision maker could discipline both 
experts to disclose their information by making one value the future more. Also, an expert might be made 
to tell the truth by being paired with another with high initial reputation. However, negative outcomes still 
persist, such as the possibility that unbiased experts end up misreporting their signals in order to disavow 
their perceived predisposition.  
In the third chapter I study self-dealing in organizations where investors are aware of the existence of 
different participants in a project. The model involves two-layers of moral hazard, where a manager acts 
simultaneously as an agent to an investor and as a principal to the employees of the firm. The manager's 
role is to determine the allocation of the uncontractible resources at his discretion. The optimal executive 
compensation offered by the investor takes into account the ease with which the employees exert effort 
and  the trade-offs that arise in the process of committing resources.  
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Introduction
This thesis focuses on questions of governance within a career concerns framework
or through an optimal contracts perspective.
Many times, we are unable to gain knowledge that would guide our actions.
This is why we rely on expertsopinions in various elds. We often observe that
decision makers need to take action based on the opinion of experts from opposing
sides. What happens when they cannot verify the veracity of the expertsclaims?
In the rst two chapters of this thesis, I describe a situation where informed experts
motivated by reputational concerns outwardly appear to agree even though they
provide biased information. Under certain conditions on relative initial reputations,
one of the experts is disavowing her perceived bias as a strategic reaction to possible
misreporting by the other. I call this conformity as separation.
This paper is connected to di¤erent strands of the career concerns literature.
Morris (2001) studies reputational distortions when there is uncertain misalignment
of preferences between a principal and an agent. My innovation is to incorporate
strategic interaction and unveriability of states in this context. I also connect
the model to the concept of anti-herding (e.g. see Levy, 2004), developed in a
setting where there is asymmetric information on expertsabilities rather than their
preferences.
A political economy example of this model could refer to a situation where
two leaders from opposing parties recommend policies to an uninformed electorate
before an election. Both leaders could be fair and have preferences aligned with the
electorate or they could be biased towards their party agenda. Once the election
takes place and a policy is implemented the true state is not veriable any longer.
Another example could be taken from organizations when an employee and her
supervisor report to the CEO on how well she performed a task so that she is
considered for promotion. The honest employee reports her evaluation correctly,
while the dishonest one exaggerates her performance. The supervisor in contrast
could be biased against the employee or fair. The CEO is unable to verify the true
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performance.
In terms of comparative statics, I show that a principal could discipline both
experts to disclose their information by making one value the future more. Further,
an expert might be made to tell the truth by being paired with another with high
reputation. However, negative aspects still remain, such as the fact that good
experts might end up misreporting their signals in order to disavow their perceived
predisposition.
In the third chapter, I study a rm in which a manager could optimally use
his private benets to incentivize the exertion of exceptional e¤ort from rms
employees. The model involves two layers of moral hazard where a manager acts
simultaneously as an agent for an investor and as a principal to the employees.
The corporate governance literature has dealt with four ways in which managers
may act against the ownersbest interests: insu¢ cient e¤ort, extravagant invest-
ment, entrenchment strategies, and self-dealing. As summarized in Tirole (2006),
these are essentially all di¤erent moral hazard problems. In this paper I focus only on
self-dealing, which is traditionally solved by compensating the manager su¢ ciently
so that he does not divert investment for private benet. However, I show that
this may not always be the optimal incentive scheme once we take into account the
overall structure of the rm.
I nd that if the proportion of discretionary funds is within a specic range,
the manager can be made to forego his private benet and instead use the funds
available to incentivize exertion of e¤ort. Thus, in my model self-dealing loses the
exclusively negative connotation that was attached to it by the contracts literature. I
argue that an investor who sets the managerial compensation must take into account
the trade-o¤s the manager faces in the process of disbursing resources, particularly
keeping in mind the ease with which the workers perform their tasks. The model
o¤ers a plausible mechanism that relates self-dealing to the emergence of di¤erent
forms of corporate governance across the world.
2
Chapter 1
Conforming to Stand Out:
A Model of Career Concerns with Biased Experts
1 Introduction
The reliability of an experts advice is centrally important in many economic settings,
whether it be in public policy or organizational decision making. It is clear then that
we must be concerned about the incentives faced by experts, which may include their
desire for a particular outcome and for career advancement. In order to learn about
these incentives we typically assume that any advice is eventually validated. How-
ever, there are many situations where we cannot observe the underlying information
that is required. One way to overcome this could be to seek multiple opinions, but
we often nd that experts come from opposing backgrounds. How, then, do we
interpret their reports? Do they always side with their respective ideologies? Do
they sometimes agree, and can we infer from their agreement that their reports are
correct?
Situations like this are seen in politics, in government, and in organizations in
general. For instance, politicians may state views that are traditionally opposed to
their asserted party positions. In the United States, the term Republicratis widely
used to refer to someone who belongs to one party but often supports the policies
of the other. The phenomena of New Labour and of Compassionate Conservatism
in the United Kingdom also come to mind. As a more specic example, the new
leadership of the Labour party in the UK has recently expressed an openness to
reducing the inuence of unions (their biggest funder) on the party. Further, they
announced their intention to be even tougher than the Conservatives in implement-
ing welfare caps, a signature policy of the Conservative party in government. Some
commentators claim that this is a response to persistent labeling of the current
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leadership of the party as being very left-leaning. How does the public determine
whether these moves are based on a genuine analysis of policy imperatives, or are
simply calculated to earn credibility with the electorate? On the ip side, is there
an action the Conservatives could take that would be better for their reputation?
Moreover, is their choice a¤ected by the extent to which each party is perceived as
being away from the centre?
In order to explore the questions above, I construct a reputation forming game
involving a decision maker and two experts, where each of the experts may be biased
in the opposite direction to the other. The experts report over two periods about
the state of the world to the decision maker who then takes an action based on these
reports. Career concerns enter because of the relative value that experts place on
the present and the future. The experts are imperfectly informed about the state,
while at the same time the decision maker is not able to verify it.
The state of the world is reected in the two opposing points of view, and each
of the states are equally probable. The decision maker chooses an action to be as
close as possible to the realized state, but the only way for him to do that is to
consider both reports and draw a conclusion given information about the agents
ability, potential biases, degree of career concerns, and reputation. The fact that
the unveriability of the state leads an experts reputation to be based instead on the
combined information in the two reports is a departure from the regular reputation
forming models. I argue that it o¤ers explanations for a larger pool of settings that
we face in the real world.
If the experts are unbiased, their preferences are e¤ectively aligned with the
decision maker, and thus we can think of them as a good type. By contrast, the
biased agents have a preference for actions that reect one point of view, and we can
think of them as the bad type. Thus, the uncertainty about types is not based on
ability (signal precision is known), but on alignment of preferences with the decision
maker.
The game is solved by backward induction. The objective is to identify the ways
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in which career concerns may distort the behavior of the experts. Naturally, in the
last period, the experts have no incentive to deviate from their preferences. Thus, in
the second period there exists an informative equilibrium in which the good experts
report their signals while the bad experts their biases. As this situation reects a
cheap talk setting, a non-informative equilibrium also exists where no information
is transmitted to the decision maker.
In the rst period, the experts must trade o¤ their respective current preferences
against the incentive to report in the opposite direction of their possible bias for
reputational reasons. However, they must now also strategically respond to the
possibility of misreporting by their counterpart. Depending on experts initial
reputations, signal precisions, and their relative preference for the future, I show
the existence of truthtelling, informative and non-informative equilibria.
In a truthtelling equilibrium the good experts disclose fully their signals while
the bad ones do so partially. The informative equilibrium occurs when good experts
career concerns become more important and they also start to report their signals
only partially. A limiting case is the babbling equilibrium when the good experts
never give a report consistent with their perceived bias, and the bad experts of the
same appartenance pool on this strategy.
In non-babbling equilibria I discover a new type of behavior: when there is a
high probability that one expert will misreport the truth, the other expert will tend
to o¤er the same report. Here, she is conforming not for the purpose of proving that
she is the same as her counterpart, but in order to distinguish herself, e¤ectively
o¤ering a comparison to the reliability of the other expert. She signals that she is
of a good type but she must have committed an error (considering that her report
is in the opposite direction of her own potential bias, while the counterparts report
is close to the counterparts own bias). This is what I will call Conformity as
separation.
The ip side of the above result is that, when we observe this form of conformity,
the decision maker ends up placing a higher probability on the state opposite to both
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reports. In other words this is a situation in which both experts transmit biased
information while the decision maker is more likely not to believe it.
This paper also o¤ers other economic implications. I show that if both experts
are of a bad type, making one to value the future more will discipline both of them
disclose their signals with a higher probability. This is because, going into the second
period, a bad expert cannot a¤ord to lose reputation relative to another bad expert.
Also, I nd that if the precision of one experts signal is reduced, a bad expert
is more likely to lie in equilibrium as the decision maker is unable to di¤erentiate
between a good expert that got a wrong signal and a bad expert that lies.
Further, consider that a decision maker is able to pick one expert with higher
reputation out of a pool. In case this expert turns out to be of a bad type she is
more likely to lie in equilibrium. On the other hand, her counterpart is more likely
to tell the truth. Even though these are opposing e¤ects, in terms of the decision
makers welfare, I show that the overall e¤ect is positive.
My paper is most closely linked to Morris (2001), in the sense that it features
career concerns and misalignment of preferences. Morris shows two key results:
a good expert may not disclose her signal when doing so impinges on her future
reputation (political correctness) and a bad expert might be induced to tell the
truth even though it is against her preference for the same reputational reason. I
move away fromMorris in three signicant ways. First, I allow for the state not to be
veriable. I then involve another expert, but I also consider the possibility commonly
observed in economic problems that there is no generally accepted reference point for
being biased. This is not hard to imagine. In a recent opinion blog, Krugman (2012)
complains about a new political correctness,whereby politicians seem inclined to
pander to the views of conservatives (just the same way as political correctness
was originally identied with liberal values). I am therefore careful not to interpret
outcomes of conformity as instances of politically correct behavior.
I nonetheless attempt to draw links between Morrisndings in the case of one
agent, and also with other forms of behavior seen in the career concerns literature.
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If one expert in my model is biased for sure, I show in an extension that the decision
maker will ignore her. This can be interpreted as Morrismodel with no state
veriability, where in order to relate it to my model I allow for the existence of
any prior about the state of the world. I nd that the experts report against their
potential bias, but more so when the prior is in favor of their bias. Thus we may
see greater distortion as the prior varies from 0 to 1, rather than remain at 0:5 as in
Morris. At the same time, declaring against her bias is less valuable to the expert as
the prior gets closer to this opposing value. This result is similar with the concept
of anti-herding developed by Levy (2004) and others. In the case of the anti-herding
papers, the asymmetric information about type is on the dimension of ability rather
than alignment of preferences.
As we move further from Morris by adding another expert with uncertain oppos-
ing bias, we now see that there are settings when the decision maker may be able
to infer better information even though biased reports are transmitted to him.
The combined e¤ect of strategic interaction between experts and unveriability
of states thus o¤ers novel insights into di¤erent motivations for conforming. The
term conformity has been used widely in the literature to refer to situations where
individuals comply with a social norm as in Bernheim (1994). Here it refers only to
the fact that experts take similar actions.
In the context of the wider literature on career concerns, this paper is related
in a behavioral sense to the two strands in which there is asymmetric information
about ability or misalignment of preferences. In terms of ability, Levy (2004) shows
that managers might anti-herd or excessively contradict public information to
distinguish themselves from the rest and increase their reputation. On the other
hand, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) explore the behavior of managers when they
ignore their own information and may herd on the othersactions for the purpose of
being perceived informed. In these papers, the uncertain types are in the dimension
of ability, unlike Sobel (1985), and Morris (2001) who construct models where the
uncertain type is based on the alignment of preferences with a principal.
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Other relevant papers include Prendergast and Stole (1996), where in a dynamic
setting analysts initially overweight their information so that they are initially
seen as fast learners; later in their career they become conservative. Ottaviani
and Sorensen (2001) look for an optimal information transmission by designing a
reputation model where experts act in a similar way.
This work is also related to research involving cheap talk with multiple senders in
the presence of misalignment of preferences. Some relevant papers include Gilligan
and Krehbiel (1989) where a committee composed of two perfectly informed experts
with (sure) opposing biases o¤ers advice to a legislator. Morgan and Krishna (2001)
allow the experts not to have necessarily opposing biases while the advice is o¤ered
simultaneously or sequentially. Austen-Smith (1993) studies a cheap talk model
with two imperfectly informed experts. McGee and Yang (2013) look at a decision
problem when the experts have complementary information. In these papers the
experts are interested only in their current payo¤s without an interest in their future
career.
The real world applicability of my model could be quite wide ranging. Some
examples include:
1. A decision maker takes the advice of two political advisers - one from the left
of the political spectrum and the other from the right. Both the advisers could
be fair and have preferences aligned with the decision maker - in the sense that
their advice is as close as possible to the state of the world, or they could be
biased towards their party agenda. The state of the world is not veriable
in this case and once the advice is implemented the initial state of the world
based on which the advice was implemented is not observable anymore.
2. An employee and her supervisor report to the head of the organization on
how well the employee performed a task. Both of them can evaluate the
performance correctly but not with full precision. The honest employee would
report her evaluation correctly, while the dishonest employee would exaggerate
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her performance. In the same way, the supervisor could be good and report
truly his evaluation of the task, or he can be biased with a preference for
reporting negatively on the employee. The head of the organization has to
compare the reports of both employee and supervisor when taking a decision
for promotion but also to update her belief on the type of the two employees for
future reference. It is important to note that this game is one of information
aggregation and transmission - the experts are similar in every aspect apart
from the quality of their signal and their possible biases. This model does not
illuminate other aspects such as the inuence of power or hierarchy.
3. Financial analysts writing a report on new investment o¤erings may have
biases that lead them to talk up or down the security values. Such biases
could arise from the nature of an industry (a green technology rm whose
prospects depend on concerted global action against climate change), or from
views about economic policy (bonds issued by a state where there is a debate
on the sustainability of government expenditures). In both cases, the nal
outcome may arise over a relatively long period, so a useful way to evaluate
the reports of the analysts would be to consider both sides of the story in the
context of the existing reputation of the analysts.
4. Further examples could include funding decisions on di¤erent research projects
in a research lab. Also, when there is a jury decision in a murder trial with
no confession but expert testimonies, an expert could make herself available
to o¤er support for either the prosecution or defence teams.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section I describe the
model. As the game is set over two periods, in section 3 I nd and characterize the
equilibrium in the last stage game; in section 4 I characterize and show the existence
of the equilibrium in the rst stage and I provide a specic case with truthtelling in
equilibrium; in section 5 I provide numerical solutions and show some comparative
static analyses, while in section 6 I provide some potential extensions; section 7
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concludes. All proofs that are not in the text appear in the appendix.
2 Model
There are three players in this game: a decision maker D, and two experts (L and
R). The game is played over two periods, t 2 f1; 2g.
There is an underlying state of the world xt which can take values of 0 and 1
with equal probability. The states of the world are drawn independently each time.
The decision maker is not able to verify the state of the world in either period.
However, each of the experts receive a noisy but informative private signal about
the true state of the world each period: sit 2 f0; 1g, where i 2 fL;Rg. The signal
has precision pi = Pr [sit = xtjxt] > 12 .
The decision maker receives reports lt and rt about xt from L and R respectively.
Based on these reports, he takes an action at 2 [0; 1]. His objective is to be as
close as possible to the true state of the world, so I set his expected payo¤ to be:
 1E (x1   a1)2   2E (x2   a2)2.
There are two types of experts: good(G) and bad(B) and the decision maker
D is uncertain of their type. Ds prior probability that R is of type G is R1 2 (0; 1)
while his prior probability that L is of type G is L1 2 (0; 1). 1 
 
L1 ; 
R
1

.
The good experts have preferences aligned with the decision maker, which is
reected in their payo¤ structure.
If the expertR is good, her payo¤is RG1 E

(x1   a1)2 jsR1
 RG2 E (x2   a2)2 jsR2 .
A good expert L has exactly the same payo¤ as a good expert R, adjusted
however to the signal she observes:  LG1 E

(x1   a1)2 jsL1
 LG2 E (x2   a2)2 jsL2 .
The bad experts are biased towards either 1 or 0. If R is bad, she has a higher
utility when the action taken by D is closer to 1. Her payo¤ is RB1 a1 +
RB
2 a2, while
the bad expert Ls payo¤ is:  LB1 a1   LB2 a2, which reects a bias towards 0:
The experts could value the present di¤erent than the future by assigning di¤er-
ent weights to current and future payo¤s: ik1 > 0,and 
ik
2 > 0 with i 2 fL;Rg ; k 2
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fG;Bg. These weights reect di¤erent time preferences between experts and allow
for situations in which any of the parties involved could value the future payo¤more
than the current one.
After observing l1 and r1, D updates his beliefs on the type of the experts and
on the state of the world x1. The posterior reputations are denoted 2 
 
L2 ; 
R
2

and the belief on the state of the world   (x1jl1; r1) = Pr (x1jl1; r1). For simplicity of
notations I denote the posterior belief that the state of the world is 1 with   (l1; r1).
If the state of the world were veriable, the decision maker could update the
reputations by comparing the reports of the experts with the realized state. When
the state is unknown, the updating is based only on the reports of the experts,
keeping in mind their initial reputation.
In the second period (t = 2) the game is repeated, with the state of the world
x2 independent of x1. In this model, everything apart from the type of the experts
and their private signals is known by everyone.
2.1 Strategies and Solution Concept
The strategy prole for the players is
 
Rkt
 
sRt

; Lkt
 
sLt

; at (lt; rt)

, where Rkt
 
sRt

is Rs probability of reporting 1 when the signal is sRt , 
L
kt
 
sLt

is probability of
reporting 0 when the signal is sLt , and at (lt; rt) is the action taken by the decision
maker given lt and rt. It is important to note that the expertsstrategies represent
the probability that their report is the same as their potential bias.
Denition 1 A Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a strategy prole Rkt
 
sRt

, Lkt
 
sLt

,
at (lt; rt) such that (a) the expertss reports given their signals maximize their respec-
tive payo¤s given the posterior reputational beliefs, (b) the decision makers action
maximizes his expected payo¤ given his posterior probability on the state of the world
and (c) the posterior probabilities on the type of the expert and the state of the world
are derived according to Bayesrule.
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As the game is set over two periods the equilibrium outcomes will be determined
by backward induction. In each stage game I will use the strategy prole without a
time subscript for notational ease.
3 The Second Stage - No Reputational Concerns
In the last period R and L enter with reputations R2 and 
L
2 . This is a cheap talk
game where the experts reports do not enter their payo¤ directly but indirectly
through the inuence they have on Ds belief about the state of the world and
consequently through Ds action.
As the reports are costless, there always exist equilibria in which the decision
maker does not infer anything from these reports so there is no incentive for the
senders to send them anyway - this is a common feature of cheap talk games. These
types of equilibria are called uninformative or babbling equilibria. By contrast the
informative equilibria are those in which some information is transmitted by the
experts to the decision maker.
For this particular game I will analyze both babbling and informative equilibria.
Babbling equilibrium is a situation in which each expert independent of her type
randomizes with equal probability of reporting 0 or 1. In this case the decision
maker will learn nothing from the messages and will continue to believe that the
states are equally likely and the action is a = 1
2
, independent of the message. The
experts also have no incentives to deviate from the uninformative actions.
An informative equilibrium is an equilibrium in which expertsreports are cor-
related with the state of the world for any l2; r2.
Proposition 1 There exists an informative equilibrium where the decision makers
optimal action is a2 (l2; r2) =   (l2; r2). The good experts optimal strategies are
RG (1) = 1, 
R
G (0) = 0, 
L
G (0) = 1, and 
L
G (1) = 0. The bad expertsstrategies are
iB (s
i
2) = 1, for any i 2 fL;Rg.
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The above equilibrium strategies reect the fact that in the last period the good
experts declare their signals while the bad expertsreports are consistent with their
respective biases.
The idea behind this proposition is the fact that in an informative equilibrium
both the messages sent by the players carry some information to the decision maker.
Essentially, if the decision maker observes 1 from R (the message is informative) he
will choose a higher action than if he had observed 0, thus the bad expert R will have
a strict incentive to declare 1 while the good expert R will have a strict incentive to
truthfully reveal her signal. If the decision maker observes 1 from L, he will increase
his action while if he observes 0 he will decrease his action. Thus the bad expert L
declares 0 while the good expert L declares her signal.
The optimal action of the decision maker for all possible reports is:
a2 (l2; r2) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
pL(1 pR)
A
if l2 = 1; r2 = 0
(1 L2 pL)(1 pR)
1 L2 A
if l2 = 0; r2 = 0
pL(1 (1 pR)R2 )
1 R2 A
if l2 = 1; r2 = 1
(1 pLL2 )(1 (1 pR)R2 )
2 R2  L2 +R2 L2 A
if l2 = 0; r2 = 1
where A   1  pL pR + pL  1  pR could be seen as an average precision of the
players. Please see in the Appendix how the decision makers optimal action is
obtained.
3.1 Second Period Reputations - Some Insights
There are some straightforward results that shed some light on how expertsactions
complement each other when career concerns are no longer present.
The experts enter the second period with reputations 2 
 
L2 ; 
R
2

, which they
built in the rst period. The e¤ect of their reputations on the decision makers
action in the second period is utterly important to them as it determines an optimal
course of action for both the experts in the rst period.
First, if both the experts report 0 the decision makers action a2 (l2 = 0; r2 = 0)
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decreases with the reputation of L while it does not depend on the reputation of R.
This is due to the fact that the posterior belief that the true state is 0 increases
with the reputation of L as biased reports are less likely to arrive from experts with
better reputation. As R has no incentive for wrongly reporting 0 her reputation will
not be at play in this case. In other words, R is good with probability 1.
Similarly, when both experts report 1, the same analysis as above stands. The
action of the decision maker a2 (l2 = 1; r2 = 1) is increasing in the reputation of R
as a 1 report is more likely to be the truth, and it does not depend on the reputation
of L.
Second, if the message of L is 0 and the message of R is 1 the optimal action
a2 (l2 = 0; r2 = 1) is increasing in the reputation of R and decreasing in the reputa-
tion of L. This is due to the fact that if L has a good reputation a 0 report is more
likely to be the truth while if R has a good reputation a 1 report is more likely to
be the truth.
A di¤erent question worth analyzing is how the individual reputational change
a¤ects expertsexpected payo¤s in the second period.
For a good type R the value of reputation acquired from the rst period is her
ex-ante expected payo¤ E (x2   a2)2 j2 and it is calculated as follows:
vGR (2) =  
P
x2
P
m
P
n
Pr (x2) Pr

sR2 = njx2

Pr [l2 = mjx2] (x2   a2 (l2 = m; r2 = n))2.
In the above expression x2;m; n 2 f0; 1g. Similarly for a good type L the value
of her reputation is her ex-ante expected payo¤ in the second period.1
These expressions take into account that if the state of the world is drawn
independently each time, a good expert entering the second period could face either
a state 0 or 1 with equal probability while there is also uncertainty on the signal
received by both experts given the state.
The bad experts however are biased towards 0 or 1 respectively, so irrespective of
their signals, their expected payo¤s feature these biases. As a result Rs reputational
value is
1vGL =  
P
x2
P
m
P
n
Pr (x2) Pr

sL2 = mjx2

Pr (r2 = njx2) (x2   a2 (l2 = m; r2 = n))2
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vBR (2) =
P
x2
P
m
Pr (x2) Pr [l2 = mjx2] a2 (l2 = m; r2 = 1).
Similarly, L s reputational value accounts for a bias towards 0.2
Proposition 2 The second period ex-ante expected pay-o¤ of an expert increases in
her reputation irrespective of her type. It also (weakly) increases in the reputation
of the counterpart irrespective of type.
For proof and some discussions please see the Appendix.
The above proposition gives us a very important result which says that the
experts, once they care about their future, try to acquire a good reputation in the
rst period.
The last part of the proposition accounts for the fact that a good expert prefers
to be as close as possible to the state of the world so she would prefer to be paired
with another good expert. The bad expert also prefers to have a counterpart of a
good type as a bad counterpart will always report in the opposite direction of her
preference.
Equilibrium Selection: In the rst period I showed that there exist a babbling
equilibrium in which no information is transmitted to the decision maker and an
informative equilibrium in which the good experts disclose their signals while the bad
ones the biases. Note that this is only an existence result and it does not addresses
questions of uniqueness. I focus next on the described informative equilibrium as
the babbling equilibrium in the second period does not induce reputational concerns
in the rst period.
4 First Stage Game
The rst period game is similar with the second period game with the exception
that the experts (R and L) have reputational concerns for the second period of the
game. The prior probability of the experts being good is 1 
 
L1 ; 
R
1

.
2vLB =  
P
x2
P
n
Pr (x2) Pr [r2 = njx2] a2 (l2 = 0; r2 = n)
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Expertstotal payo¤functions account for both current and future payo¤s, taking
into account their relative time preference. For notational ease I will represent the
total payo¤s in terms of the relative weight of the rst period payo¤ i.e. ik  ik1
ik2
with i 2 fL;Rg, k 2 fG;Bg. k represents the vector of relative weights of experts
of type k :
 
Lk; Rk

:
Expertstotal payo¤ is the sum of the rst stage payo¤ weighted by the appro-
priate time preference and the second stage expected payo¤ (which I called in the
previous section expertsvalue of reputation).
The good expertstotal payo¤ is iGuiG (l1; r1; s
i
1) + v
k
G (2) where k 2 fG;Bg.
Their current payo¤ uiG (l1; r1; s
i
1) is  E (x1   a1 (l1; r1) jsi1)2 and captures the ob-
jective of the good experts to take an action as close as possible to the state of the
world.3
The bad expertstotal payo¤s account for their preference for di¤erent states.
As a result an R expert of bad type has a total payo¤ of RBuRB (l1; r1) + v
R
B (2)
where uRB (l1; r1) = a1 (l1; r1) while an L expert of bad type has a total payo¤
LBuLB (l1; r1) + v
L
B (2) where u
L
B (l1; r1) =  a1 (l1; r1).
4.1 Reputation Formation
The experts enter the rst stage game with some initial priors on their reputation
1. After they send their reports, the decision maker updates his belief on their
types. 2 is the vector of posterior reputations.
In determining these posterior reputations the interaction between the experts
actions is captured by Lk (ljr) and Rk (rjl) which are the probabilities that a type
k 2 fG;Bg expert whether L or R sends a particular report given the counterparts
report. These probabilities take into account the fact that the state of the world is
not veriable.
3uRG
 
l1; r1; s
R
1 = 1

=  E  x1   a1 (l1; r1) jsR1 = 12 =   12pR + pRa1 (l1; r1)  12a1 (l1; r1)2
uLG
 
l1; r1; s
L
1 = 0

=  E  x1   a1 (l1; r1) jsL1 = 02 =   12 (1 pL)+(1 pL)a1 (l1; r1)  12a1 (l1; r1)2
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Rk (r1jl1) =
X
x1=f0;1g
Rk (r1jx1) Pr (x1jl1)
where Rk (1jx1) =

pRRk (x1) +
 
1  pR  Rk (1  x1).4 Note that Rk (r1jx1)
denotes the probability that a type k expert R sends message r when the state is x1.
In the above expression Pr (x1jl1) represents the state probability given Ls report
and is calculated by Bayesrule.5
The probability that a k  type L sends message l when R sends message r is
calculated in a similar fashion as Rk (r1jl1).6
Thus, the posterior probability of an expert R to be of a good type is:
R2 (l1; r1) =
R1 
R
G (r1jl1)
R1 
R
G (r1jl1) +
 
1  R1

RB (r1jl1)
while the posterior probability of an expert L to be of a good type is:
L2 (l1; r1) =
L1
L
G (l1jr1)
L1
L
G (l1jr1) +
 
1  L1

LB (l1jr1)
Remark 1 Expertsreputations are una¤ected in the rst period (R2 (l1; r1) = 
R
1
and L2 (l1; r1) = 
L
1 ) whenever 
R
G (r1jl1) = RB (r1jl1) and LG (l1jr1) = LB (l1jr1)
respectively.
This occurs when either both L and R babble or report truthfully on their
message. If so, either no information is disclosed to the decision maker or there is
full disclosure.
Remark 2 The posterior reputation R2 (l1; r1) decreases with
RB(r1jl1)
RG(r1jl1)
. Given Ls
report the higher the message that the bad type R expert is likely to send relative to
the good type, the lower Rs posterior reputation is after the reports are seen.
4Lk (l1 = 1jx1) =

pL
 
1  Lk (x1)

+
 
1  pL  1  Lk (1  x1)
5Pr (x1jl1) = Pr(xi) Pr(l1jxi)P
x1=f0;1g
Pr(xi) Pr(l1jxi)
6Lk (l1jr1) =
P
x1=f0;1g
Lk (l1jx1) Pr (x1jr1)
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4.1.1 Posterior Belief on the State of the World
The decision maker updates not only her belief on the type of the experts but also
on the state of the world. The posterior belief that the state is 1 when the messages
are (l1; r1) is:
  (l1; r1) =
Pr (l1; r1j1)
Pr (l1; r1j1) + Pr (l1; r1j0)
with
Pr (l1; r1jx1) =

R1 
R
G (r1jx1) +
 
1  R1

RB (r1jx1)


L1
L
G (l1jx1) +
 
1  L1

lB (l1jx1)

for x1 2 f0; 1g :
Remark 3 If both experts babble, or RG (r1jx) = RB (r1jx) and LG (l1jx) = LB (l1jx),
then the posterior belief is that the states of the world are equally likely.
4.2 First Stage Equilibrium
Similar with the second period game, D does not observe the state and as a result
his optimal action is his posterior belief about the state of the world.
a1 (l1; r1) =   (l1; r1)
The expected payo¤of a goodexpert R when L sends message l1 andD believes
that the state is 1 with probability   (l1; r1) is uRG (l1; r1) while the expected payo¤
of a badexpert R is uRB ( ) = u
R
B (a

1) = a

1 (l1; r1). Similarly u
L
G ( ) is the expected
payo¤ of a good expert while uLB (l1; r1) = u
L
B (a

1) =  a1 (l1; r1) is the expected
payo¤ of a bad expert.
Again we could identify two types of strategies in this rst period game: babbling
strategies when no information is transmitted to the decision maker and informative
strategies.
18
Denition 2
 
Rk ; 
L
k ; ; 
R
2 ; 
L
2

is a babbling strategy prole if for c1; c2 2 [0; 1] :
(1) RG (0) = 
R
B (0) = 
R
G (1) = 
R
B (1) = c1; (2) 
L
G (0) = 
L
B (0) = 
L
G (1) = 
L
B (1) =
c2; (3) 
R
2 (l1; r1) = 
R
1 , 
L
2 (l1; r1) = 
L
1 and   (l1; r1) =
1
2
for any l1; r1:
As this is a cheap talk game there always exists a babbling equilibrium and hence
the following claim:
Claim 4 Every babbling strategy prole is an equilibrium.
This claim is true since if everyone babbles than the decision maker does not
infer anything on the state of the world or the type of the experts, so the posteriors
will be equal with the priors and no one will have a unilateral incentive to deviate.
Proposition 3 An informative equilibrium
 
Rk ; 
L
k ; ; 
R
2 ; 
L
2

satises the follow-
ing properties:
1. When the good expert R observes signal sR1 = 0, she always announces 0 -
RG (0) = 0; truthtelling is always optimal for R when her signal is 0.
2. When the good expert L observes signal sL1 = 1, she always announces 1 -
LG (1) = 0; truthtelling is always optimal for L when her signal is 1.
For a proof, please see the Appendix. This result tells us that the good agents
always tell their signal when there is no reputational incentive for not doing so.
Intuitively, if Rs signal is 0 she never reports 1 as by doing so she only damages
her reputation while her current gain decreases. The same argument applies to the
good L agent who never reports 0 when her signal is 1:
In the rst period the experts not only transmit information to the decision
maker about the state of the world but also acquire reputation which will impact
the decision makers second period action. The following proposition summarizes
the reputational incentives in equilibrium.
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Proposition 4 In equilibrium the reputations are such that :
1. R2 (l1; 0)  R2 (l1; 1) for l1 2 f0; 1g with one strict inequality;
2. L2 (1; r1)  R2 (0; r1) for r1 2 f0; 1g with one strict inequality;
3. R2 (1; r1)  R2 (0; r1) i¤ L1  L1 : If instead, L1 < L1 then R2 (1; r1) <
R2 (0; r1) where:

L
1 =
LB (0)  LB (1)
LG (0) + 
L
B (1)  LB (0)
4. L2 (l1; 0)  L2 (l1; 1) i¤ R1  R1 If instead R1 < R1 ; then L2 (l1; 0) < L2 (l1; 1)
where

R
1 =
RB (1)  RB (0)
RG (1) + 
R
B (0)  RB (1)
Reputational concerns make the experts to announce against their signal just
for the purpose of showing that they are not biased. In particular, the R expert
has always a strict incentive to announce 0 irrespective of the announcement of the
L expert while the L expert has an incentive of announcing 1. This is an act of
disavowing ones perceived bias.
However, there are also other incentives at play; these refer to the reportse¤ect
on the expertsreputation in relation to the counterpartsreports. Morris (2001)
showed that if the states were veriable it would be more important for a good R
expert to announce 0 when the state is 1 rather than 0. The reason for this is that
by reporting 0 when the state is 1 the expert shows that she is of a good but it is
possible that she did not observed the true state of the world as her signal is not
fully precise.
When the states are not veriable, both the reports have to be compared for the
purpose of reputation formation. Now, the initial reputations of the experts plays a
major role in determining the value of disavowing ones bias when the counterpart
changes her report from 0 to 1. The decision maker now updates her beliefs on
the state of the world and expertstype by looking at Rs report in relation with
a likelihood of a state of the world. This likelihood is captured in Ls report. The
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more likely is L to misreport the state of the world the more L is perceived to be
biased. As a result we could have situations in which a 0 report from R could be
more important for reputation formation both when L announces 0 rather than 1
or the opposite.
Points 1 and 2 of the proposition can be reduced to the following: A bad expert
R reports 1 more often than a good expert R as RB (1)  RG (1) and RB (0)  RG (0)
with one strict inequality.7 Similarly, a bad expert L reports 0 more often than a
good expert L as LB (0)  LG (0) and LB (1)  LG (1) with one strict inequality.
The expression L1  L1 in point 3 is equivalent with Pr (l1 = 1jx1 = 1) 
Pr (l1 = 1jx1 = 0), which means that L has a high probability of conveying the true
state of the world.
4.2.1 Equilibrium Reputations - Further Insights
One of the major results conveyed in Morris (2001) is that when states are veriable
the incentive to report against ones bias depends on the state of the world. In
particular, he nds that the reputation coming from announcing 0 is greater for an
expert biased towards 1, when the state is 1 rather than 0. In this study however,
as the states are not veriable the decision maker compares both expertsreports
and then makes a decision; in the next subsections I discuss how the equilibrium
reputation of one expert changes with the counterparts report.
4.2.2 Conforming as a form of separation
When the state of the world is not veriable an expert decides what to report based
on her counterparts initial reputation. We see now that taking the same action
does not necessarily mean that the experts agree with each other - it is just an
information transmission mechanism regarding their level of trustworthiness. This
follows from the following corollary (from Proposition 4, point 3, when r1 = 0):
7This is due to 
R
B(1j1)
RG(1j1)
 RB(0j1)
RG(0j1)
=
1 RB(1j1)
1 RG(1j1)
, RB (1j1)  RG (1j1) and 
R
B(1j0)
RG(1j0)
 RB(0j0)
RG(0j0)
=
1 RB(1j0)
1 RG(1j0)
, RB (1j0)  RG (1j0)
21
Corollary 1 R2 (1; 0) < 
R
2 (0; 0) i¤ Pr (l1 = 0jx1 = 0) < Pr (l1 = 0jx1 = 1).
In particular when R says 0, D looks at Ls report and forms beliefs on both
expertstype and the state of the world. If the chance is high that L misreports the
state a 0 report is more likely to come from a state 1 than from a state 0. Then,
in contrast with the veriable case it is more important for R to say 0 when L says
0 than when L says 1. This arises from the e¤ect on R0s future reputation from
signaling: Because you believe that my counterpart is most likely to say 0 wrongly
due to her bias, my saying 0 should show you that I am not biased. Since I am as far
away as possible from 1; which you gured out is probably closer to the true state
of the world, it looks I am acting in good faith but I got an imprecise signal on the
state, so I am of a good type.What might look like agreeing with the counterpart
in fact is not necessarily true; I do as you do so I can di¤erentiate myself from
you.
In this situation we still have that the experts report against their potential biases
for reputational reasons, however the experts might also report against their bias in
order to di¤erentiate themselves from the highly likely biased counterpart. This is
what I call conformity as separation. Note that this e¤ect is due to the combined
e¤ect of strategic interaction and unveriability of the states. The unveriability of
state makes an expert resort to the counterparts report in order to signal her type
as there is no xed reference point to compare against.
As an example think of a policy maker who is asking the opinion of two experts
- one hired by the left party and one hired by the right party. When the initial
situation is such that the left wing expert has a low reputation and she is likely to
misreport on the state of the world the best decision of the right wing expert is to
agree with the left expert not because she cares about left policies but as a form of
building her reputation of being a fair expert.
A historical example relevant to this result is the 1972 Nixons visit to China.
At that time Nixon was perceived as having a strong anti-communist stance but by
taking this action he gained popularity with the electorate. Note that Nixon took
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a great risk in visiting China as the American population was wary at the time of
a possible diplomatic relationship with the People Republic of China (PRC). This
was especially triggered by Taiwan being removed from the United Nations in favor
of PRC against American opposition.
4.2.3 Sending di¤erent messages as a form of separation
Interpreting the model in the context of Morris (2001), if the states are veriable the
right biased experts reputation coming from saying 1 when the state is 1 is always
higher than when the state is 0; this is due to the fact that the risk of message 1
coming from a biased expert is lower in state 1.
However, when the states are not veriable and the probability that L misreports
the state is high, D believes that when he sees 0 from L it is more likely the state is
1 rather than 0. For R, this means that reporting 1 when L says 0 is much better
than reporting 1 when L also says 1. First of all, when L says 0, Rs probability
of being biased is small given what D knows about L. On the other hand, when L
says 1, D may place a greater probability on the state being 0, hence believing that
R is likely to be biased.
Corollary 2 R2 (0; 1) > 
R
2 (1; 1) i¤ Pr (l1 = 1jx1 = 1) < Pr (l1 = 1jx1 = 0)
4.2.4 Counterpart with high reputation: no conformity as separation
If L has a high initial reputation, then R2 (1; r1)  R2 (0; r1) where r1 could be 1
or 0. This is due to an argument similar to Morris (2001): the reputation of an
expert R that reports 1 is higher when the counterparts report is 1 rather than 0
as counterparts report is likely to reect the true state of the world. In building up
this reputation D realizes that the risk of a message 1 coming from a biased expert
is lower if 1 is likely to be the true state (as per Ls report).
Also an expert R gains a higher reputation from reporting 0 when L reports 1,
compared to when L reports 0. The logic for this is that when 1 is likely to be the
true state (captured in Ls report) R makes a stronger argument of being unbiased
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by declaring 0. The case when both of the reports are 0 does not convey extra
information about the biasedness of R. In this case as the L has a high reputation
there is no conformity as separation e¤ect.
A further point worth conveying is that if the states would be fully veriable the
model would collapse to a situation in which the two experts will not strategically
interact. A possible extension of this model would be to have partial veriability
of the true states. A model of this type would nest both the current model and a
model with two experts without strategic communication.
4.3 Informative Equilibrium with Truthtelling
A question worth analyzing is whether this game supports a full truthtelling equi-
librium where both experts, irrespective of their type, report their signal i.e. an
equilibrium where experts strategies are: RG (1) = 1, 
R
G (0) = 0; 
R
B (1) = 1,
RB (0) = 0; 
L
G (1) = 0, 
L
G (0) = 1; and 
L
B (1) = 0, 
L
B (0) = 0. However, it is
easy to see that there does not exist such an equilibrium as the bad experts have
incentives to deviate to their biased preferred action.
Claim 5 There is no informative equilibrium with both R and L following full
truthtelling strategies.
This is due to the fact that if such an equilibrium exists the posterior reputations
are equal with the priors. But this implies that there is no reputational cost for any
of the bad experts of announcing their biases. As we are looking at an informative
equilibrium, we know that the decision maker takes an action positively correlated
with the reports. Thus regardless of their signals the bad experts always report their
biases. But this is a contradiction to truthtelling. So, there is no full truthtelling
equilibrium.
Lets look next under which conditions there is an equilibrium in which the good
experts report truthfully on their signal.
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Proposition 5 For any L1 2 (0; 1) and R1 2 (0; 1) there exist RG; LG 2 (0; 1)
such that if RG
 
1;
B

> RG and LG
 
1;
B

> LG there exists a unique
truthtelling equilibrium. The good R and L report their signal with probability 1,
while the bad experts report their signal only when their signals coincide with their
bias: RB (1) = 1 and 
L
B (0) = 1 and 
R
B (0) 2 (0; 1] and LB (1) 2 (0; 1].
In order to prove this proposition we assume rst that this equilibrium exists. In
any informative equilibrium the bad experts report their biases more often than the
good experts, thus the bad experts have to tell the truth when the signal received
is their respective bias (considering that the good experts always tell the truth).
However, when their signal is opposite their bias I compare their current benet
from lying with the reputation cost from telling the truth for determining their
optimal strategies.
The equilibrium is unique due to the fact that bad expertsnet current benet
from lying is a strictly decreasing function in the probability of them lying for all
possible strategies of the counterpart. Intuitively, this comes from the fact that in
the rst period the decision maker is more likely to ignore a piece of advice highly
tainted by the possibility of bias which implies a decreasing current benet from
lying; at the same time the future reputation costs are the highest when probability
of lying is close to 1 as a report opposite the potential bias could come only from a
good expert. Also, I account for the fact that experts value of reputation increases
with the rst period counterparts reputation. The monotonic properties of experts
net current benet of lying imply that there is a unique strategy for any xed
counterpart strategy. Furthermore, this translates into unique equilibrium strategies
for both bad experts.
Once I nd the equilibrium strategies of the bad experts I verify when the good
experts tell the truth in equilibrium. For having a truth-telling equilibrium one
needs to look for appropriate time preference weights which will make the good
experts tell the truth with probability 1. Please look in the appendix for a more
detailed proof.
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This particular equilibrium characterizes a situation in which the good experts
follow truth-telling strategies as they do not care too much about their future payo¤s.
Further more, the bad experts semi-pool on the actions of the good experts as they
would like to be perceived as good in the future. As a result in equilibrium the
bad experts tell the truth with probability 1 when their signals are identical to
their biases and randomize between telling the truth and lying when their signal is
opposite their bias.
I also identify a new channel through which experts disavow their perceived bias:
strategic interaction. One result of this is that the inclination of a bad expert to
declare her signal is higher when her counterpart has the same report. This is true
when the counterpart has a reputation below a threshold and is thus also likely to
be bad. This is the conformity as separation e¤ect described earlier applied to the
actions of a bad expert. Table 1 summarizes conformity as separation for a bad R
expert when sR1 = 0:
L : l1 = 1 l1 = 0
R : R2 (1; 0) < 
R
2 (0; 0)
Table 1: Conformity as separation for a bad R expert
Result 1 In equilibrium conformity as separation reects the fact that a bad R tells
0 which is the truth while L tells 0 (likely to be a biased report).
One should also realize that the bad experts still prefer to report their bias more
often than the good experts due to their di¤erent payo¤ functions so the truthtelling
equilibrium is only a semi-pooling equilibrium between good and bad experts of L
or R appartenance.
In this equilibrium the good experts tell the truth. However a question worth
analyzing is what happens when the good expertscareer concerns are getting more
important. In particular I ask what is the e¤ect of good expertscareer concerns
on the equilibrium strategies? The next section analyses the case where both good
and bad experts may distort their reports for reputational reasons.
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4.4 General Case Equilibrium
When the good experts career concerns start becoming important they start to
develop incentives to distort their reports. This is the case when the good experts
signal is their potential bias and the future benet from lying is higher than the
current benet from telling the truth. In the career concerns literature this e¤ect
was described as political correctness. In this game however the experts could be
biased in two opposing directions so both experts could disregard their signals in
order to disavow their perceived bias. Going back to the political economy example
we could have both liberal political correctness and conservative political correctness.
The bad experts will still tell the truth with a positive probability for reputation
building reasons.
In the next proposition I look at all possible equilibria: truthtelling equilib-
rium (analyzed previously), informative equilibrium when the experts (irrespective
of their type) disavow their perceived biases with positive probability and non-
informative equilibrium when no information is transmitted to the decision maker.
Proposition 6 For any L1 2 (0; 1) and R1 2 (0; 1) there exist RG; LG; RG; LG 2
(0; 1) such that:
1. if RG
 
1;
B

> RG and LG
 
1;
B

> LG there exist a truthtelling
equilibrium;
2. if RG < RG
 
1;
B
  RG or/and RG < LG  1;B  LG there exists
an informative equilibrium while;
3. if RG
 
1;
B
  R
G
or/and LG
 
1;
B
  LG the equilibria of the games are
non-informative.
In an informative equilibrium, expertstendency to report against their perceived
biases is reected in the fact that both of them could report either 0 or 1 with some
positive probability. Furthermore, if one expert has a low reputation we observe the
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conformity as separation e¤ect. This e¤ect applied to the good expert Rs actions
when sR1 = 1 is summarized in Table 2.
L : l1 = 1 l1 = 0
R : R2 (1; 0) < 
R
2 (0; 0)
Table 2: Conformity as separation in the case of good experts
Result 2 In equilibrium conformity as separation reects a situation in which the
good expert R reports 0 which is a biased report and L reports 0 - likely to be a biased
report as well.
5 Robustness Checks
This model allows for some special cases which could assist with further economic
interpretations. In the next subsections I show that the conformity as separation
e¤ect is not only specic to this environment.
In the model I do not allow the experts to have initial reputations either 0 or 1
as this could trigger the decision maker not to consider both expertsreports. So the
rst question I would like to answer is what happens at these reputational limits.
In the rst case I look at a situation in which one of the two experts is biased with
probability 1. As the decision maker does not take into account the report of the
biased expert, this reduces to a one potentially biased expert model without state
veriability. In this environment I show that the expert still prefers to report against
her potential bias for reputational reasons. Moreover if I allow for the state priors
to be di¤erent, the conformity as separation (with a slight di¤erent interpretation -
a 0 Rs report is compared with the prior on the state 0) is still preserved.
The second case is a situation where one expert is good with probability 1 while
the other is still potentially biased.
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5.1 Political Correctness as Anti-herding
If the decision maker knows L is biased with probability 1, the model reduces to one
expert potentially biased toward 1 giving a report to D. The state of the world is
x 2 f0; 1g with Pr (x1 = 0) =  and Pr (x1 = 1) = 1   ,  2 (0; 1).
Similar with the original model D is not able to verify the state of the world.
Experts posterior reputation and the posterior belief on state are obtained by
Bayesian updating given only the report provided by the expert. There is no
comparison with a counterpart or a state.
An expert R of type k 2 (G;B) reports r1 with probability Rk (r1). This
probability takes into account the fact that the state of the world could be either 0
or 1. Rk (r1) = 
R
k (r1jx = 1) Pr (x1 = 1) + Rk (r1jx1 = 0) Pr (x1 = 0).
Rs posterior reputation is:
R2 (r1) =
R1 
R
G (r1)
R1 
R
G (r1) +
 
1  R1

RB (r1)
while posterior probability that the state of the world is 1 is:
  (r1) =
Pr (r1j1) Pr (x = 1)
Pr (r1j1) Pr (x = 1) + Pr (r1j0) Pr (x = 0)
In this extension the rst result is that if a good expert gets a signal opposite
her bias, she will report it truthfully. The logic behind this is the fact that if sR1 = 0
there is no benet from lying for a good R. There are also incentives to report
against ones bias for reputational reasons. Furthermore, Rs reporting against her
potential bias decreases with the probability that the state is 0.
Proposition 7 In equilibrium the reputations are such that R2 (0) > 
R
2 (1) and
dR2 (0)
d
< 0.
The conformity as separation e¤ect in this case is captured by d
R
2 (0)
d
< 0. In
particular the intensity of declaring 0 for the purpose of disavowing ones bias
decreases with probability that the state of the world is 0. Basically, at low levels
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of  , by doing 0 R says: because the state is more likely to be 1 rather than 0, I
report 0 and thus agree with a low prior on state 0, to show the decision maker that
I am not biased as I am as far as possible from 1 which has a high probability of
being the true state.
Since conformity as separation e¤ect translates into increased probability of
telling declaring against the potential bias I could make a more clear connection of
my model with the herding literature. In particular, R is more likely to report 0 if the
prior on the 0 state is low. This means that the expert contradicts public information
by reporting 0 when the the prior on state 1 is high. This would be equivalent with
the anti-herding idea developed by Levy (2004) when careerist experts contradict
public information, applied to experts with possible misalignment of preferences.
This special case extends Morris (2001) by allowing the states of the world to
be unveriable. Morrispolitical correctness result is built however on the fact that
the decision maker compares experts report with a realized state when building
experts reputation. In this model as the state of the world of the world is uncertain,
this comparison is not viable anymore and the decision maker has to make use of
the public view on the state of the world. Similar to Morris, I nd that the experts
report against their possible bias for reputational reasons. However, in this uncertain
environment there is a further incentive in place as shown in the proposition above;
in order to build their reputation experts report also against the public prior on
the state; furthermore declaring against ones possible bias is more intense when
the public thinks the opposite. So this model depicts political correctness as an
anti-herding result.
Morriss reasoning for the political correctness is based however on Loury (1994)
who develops a syllogism for political correctness as a reputational distortion due
to the inherent inclination of members of a community to adhere to communal
values. People declare as their fellows as to not o¤end the community and remain
in good standards with their peers. Failing to do so results in the odds that the
speaker is not in fact faithful to communal values as estimated by a listener otherwise
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uniformed about his views to increase.So, Morris adheres at least conceptually to
Lourys argument, that political correctness is conformity to social norms. In this
particular case however contrary to Morris I show that people act in a political
correct manner not only to disavow their individual bias but also to show that they
hold di¤erent views than their community. Thus political correctness is not herding
but anti-herding.
5.2 Expert L is Unbiased with Probability 1 : L1 = 1
If L is unbiased with probability 1 but still is not fully informed on the state of
the world, the decision maker will still take both reports into consideration when
taking an action. However as L is a good type expert she will report her signal with
probability 1.
R however still builds up her reputation in the rst period so she has incentives
to report against her potential bias In this case, the conformity as separation e¤ect
disappears as the likelihood that L misreports on the state is low
 
pL  1
2

.
Proposition 8 In equilibrium the reputations are such that R2 (l1; 0)  R2 (l1; 1)
for l1 2 f0; 1g with one strict inequality and R2 (l1 = 1; r1)  R2 (l1 = 0; r1) for any
r1 2 f0; 1g xed.
The second part is triggered by the fact that once Ls signal precision is infor-
mative and L unbiased Pr (l1 = x1jx1)  Pr (l1 6= x1jx1) always.
Other extensions are also possible but I leave them to future work and I discuss
them briey in the conclusion below.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper lies at the congruence of three bodies of research: the career concerns
literature with uncertain misalignment of preferences between a decision maker and
agent as in Morris (2001), the career concerns literature with uncertain level of
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expertise as in Prendergast and Stole (1996), Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001), Levy
(2004), Dasgupta and Prat (2001) and cheap talk with multiple experts as in Austen-
Smith (1993), Morgan and Krishna (1999) or McGee and Yang (2009).
This study is a career concerns model where two experts have certain ability to
see the world but also uncertain misalignment of preferences with a decision maker.
In this environment in an informative equilibrium the experts have a tendency to
report in opposite direction of their perceived possible bias for reputational reason.
Also they strategically respond to the possible misreporting by the counterpart. As
a result, when there is high probability that one expert is biased the other expert
tends to o¤er the same report to show that she is of a good type but she committed
an error (considering that she could only be biased in the other direction). I call
this conformity as separation. This e¤ect is due to the fact that the decision maker
cannot verify the veracity of a speaker and furthermore there is no xed reference
point based on which he can infer anything on the type of the experts. As a result
the decision maker relies on the other experts report (which could be biased as well)
in order to deduce her type.
In terms of equilibrium existence, the model allows for a rich set of equilibrium
scenarios. Under some initial conditions there is a unique equilibrium in which good
experts tell the truth while bad experts disclose their signals only partially. Also,
depending on the degree of career concerns we can nd equilibria in which good
experts also disclose their signals only partially as they do not like to be perceived
biased. A limiting case is a situation in which no information is transmitted to the
decision maker.
In extensions to the model I also linked it to the career concerns models with anti-
herding behavior. A possible extension left to future work is to have a model with
two experts with the same potential bias. This situation is di¤erent than the current
model as a bad expert could semi-pool on a good expert (of same appartenance)
but at the same time any of the two experts (irrespective of type) could pool on
the action of the counterpart. Finally, another possible extension is to allow partial
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state veriability. A model of this type would nest both the current model and a
model with no strategic interaction between experts.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
D believes that if l2 = 1; L is good while if l2 = 0 probability that L is of a good
type is L2 . Similarly, if r2 = 0; R is good while if r2 = 1 R is good with probability
R2 .
Based on these beliefs we could compute by Bayesrule also probability of the
state being 1 in period 2.
 Pr (x2 = 1jl2 = 1; r2 = 0) = p
L(1 pR)
(1 pL)pR+pL(1 pR)
This is due to the fact that a 1 report from L happens with probability pL
while a 0 report from R happens with probability pR. Note that, in the last
period if the decision maker observes r2 = 0 and l2 = 1 he knows that both R
and L are good.
 Pr (x2 = 1jl2 = 0; r2 = 0) = (1 
L
2 p
L)(1 pR)
1 L2 (pL(1 pR)+pR(1 pL))
In calculating this probability we take into account that l2 = 0 could be sent
by both a bad and a good expert L while r2 = 0 could be sent only by a a
good R. The probability that a 0 report could come from a bias L is 1   L2
while the probability that l2 = 0 is sent by a good expert is 
L
2
 
1  pL. Thus
Pr (l2 = 0jx2 = 1) = 1   L2 + L2
 
1  pL = 1   L2 pL. We also know that
Pr (r2 = 0jx2 = 1) = 1  pR.
Hence, Pr (l2 = 0; r2 = 0jx2 = 1) =
 
1  L2 pL
  
1  pR.
Similarly when the state is 0, Pr (l2 = 0jx2 = 0) = 1   L2 + L2 pL while
Pr (r2 = 0jx2 = 0) = pR
Thus, Pr (l2 = 0; r2 = 0jx2 = 0) =
 
1  L2
 
1  pL pR. .
 Pr (x2 = 1jl2 = 1; r2 = 1) = p
L(1 (1 pR)R2 )
1 R2 [pR(1 pL)+pL(1 pR)]
I used that Pr (l2 = 1jx2 = 1) = pL and
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Pr (r2 = 1jx2 = 1) = 1  R2 + pRR2 = 1 
 
1  pRR2 .
Hence, Pr (l2 = 1; r2 = 1jx2 = 1) = pL
 
1   1  pRR2 .
Pr (l2 = 1; r2 = 1jx2 = 0) =
 
1  R2 pR
  
1  pL.
 Pr (x2 = 1jl2 = 0; r2 = 1) = (1 p
LL2 )(1 (1 pR)R2 )
2 R2  L2 +[pL(1 pR)+pR(1 pL)]R2 L2
In this result we have possibility of bias from both experts.
Pr (l2 = 0; r2 = 1jx2 = 1) =
 
1  pLL2
  
1   1  pRR2 .
Pr (l2 = 0; r2 = 1jx2 = 0) =
 
1   1  pLL2   1  pRR2 .
The denominator of the above probability is just
Pr (l2 = 0; r2 = 1jx2 = 1) + Pr (l2 = 0; r2 = 1jx2 = 0) :
We used the following intermediate probabilities in the above computations:
Pr (l2 = 1jx2 = 1) = pLL2
Pr (l2 = 1jx2 = 0) =
 
1  pLL2
Pr (l2 = 0jx2 = 1) = 1  pLL2
Pr (l2 = 0jx2 = 0) = 1 
 
1  pLL2
Pr(r2 = 1jx2 = 1) = 1 
 
1  pRR2
Pr(r2 = 1jx2 = 0) = 1  pRR2
Pr(r2 = 0jx2 = 1) =
 
1  pRR2
Pr(r2 = 0jx2 = 0) = pRR2
In any informative equilibrium the reports are positively (without loss of gener-
ality) correlated with state of the world.
As the decision makers payo¤ in the last period is  E (x2   a2)2, then for some
messages (l2; r2) the optimal action of the principal is:
a2 (l2; r2) = Pr (x2 = 1jl2; r2) 1 + Pr (x2 = 0jl2; r2) 0 = Pr (x2 = 1jl2; r2)
An expert R of good type chooses r2 such that she maximize her payo¤.
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We know that the signal precisions are such that Pr
 
sR2 = 0jx2 = 1

= 1   pR
and Pr
 
sR2 = 0jx2 = 1

= pR. Thus if the R receives sR2 = 0, then
 E
h
(x2 a2)2 jsR2 = 0
i
=8><>:  
 
1  pR [1 Pr (x2= 1jl2; r2= 0)]2 pR [Pr (x2= 1jl2; r2= 0)]2 if r2 = 0
   1  pR [1 Pr (x2= 1jl2; r2= 1)]2 pR [Pr (x2= 1jl2; r2= 1)]2 if r2 = 1
The net benet from declaring 0 instead of 1 is:
[Pr (x2 = 0jl2; r2 = 0)  Pr (x2 = 0jl2; r2 = 1)]
 2pR   Pr (x2 = 0jl2; r2 = 0)  Pr (x2 = 0jl2; r2 = 1)
This term is strictly positive as we are looking at an informative equilibrium.
Also, pR > Pr (x2 = 0jl2; r2 = 0) and pR > Pr (x2 = 0jl2; r2 = 1).
Note that the maximum Pr (x2 = 0jl2; r2 = 0) is pLpRpLpR+(1 pL)(1 pR) < pR and the
maximum Pr (x2 = 0jl2; r2 = 1) is p
L(1 pR)
pL(1 pR)+(1 pL)pR < p
R for pR; pL > 1
2
.
If R receives sR2 = 1, then
 E (x2 a2)2 jsR2 = 1 =8><>:  p
R [1 Pr (x2= 1jl2; r2= 0)]2 
 
1  pR [Pr (x2= 1jl2; r2= 0)]2 if r2 = 0
 pR [1 Pr (x2= 1jl2; r2= 1)]2 
 
1  pR [Pr (x2= 1jl2; r2= 1)]2 if r2 = 1
The net benet from declaring 1 instead of 0 is:
[Pr (x2 = 1jl2; r2 = 1)  Pr (x2 = 1jl2; r2 = 0)]
 2pR   Pr (x2 = 1jl2; r2 = 1)  Pr (x2 = 1jl2; r2 = 0)
This term is also strictly positive.
Thus, a good R experts always report her signals. By contrast, an expert R of
bad type declares 1 irrespective of her signal as r1 = 1 weakly increases the action
38
of the decision maker.
We see that thus by declaring her signal a good R strictly increases her payo¤
while a bad R weakly increases her payo¤.
By a similar argument, an expert L of good type declares her signal and an
expert L of bad type declares her bias.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
First I acknowledge that the reputation acquired in the rst period a¤ects decision
maker optimal action:
da2 (l2 = 1; r2 = 1)
dR2
=
 
1  pL pL   1 + 2pR
1  R2 A
2 > 0
da2 (l2 = 0; r2 = 1)
dR2
=

1  L2
 
1  pL  1  L2 pL  2pR   1
2  R2   L2 + R2 L2A
2 > 0
da2 (l2 = 0; r2 = 0)
dL2
=  
 
1  pR pR  1 + 2pL
1  L2A
2 < 0
da2 (l2 = 0; r2 = 1)
dL2
=

1  2
 
1  pR  1  2pR  1  2pL
2  R2   L2 + R2 L2A
2 < 0
For a good type R her expected payo¤at the beginning of period 2 given decision
maker posterior belief on the experts reputation is:
vGR (2) =  E [(x2   a2) j2]
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E [(x2   a2) j2] =
1
2
pR Pr(l2 = 1jx2 = 1) (1  Pr (x2 = 1jl2 = 1; r2 = 1))2 +
1
2
 
1  pRPr(l2 = 1jx2 = 0) (0  Pr (x2 = 1jl2 = 1; r2 = 1))2 +
1
2
 
1  pRPr(l2 = 1jx2 = 1) (1  Pr (x2 = 1jl2 = 1; r2 = 0))2
1
2
pR Pr(l2 = 1jx2 = 0) (0  Pr (x2 = 1jl2 = 1; r2 = 0))2 +
1
2
pR Pr(l2 = 0jx2 = 1) (1  Pr (x2 = 1jl2 = 0; r2 = 1))2 +
1
2
 
1  pRPr(l2 = 0jx2 = 0) (0  Pr (x2 = 1jl2 = 0; r2 = 1))2 +
1
2
(1  pR) Pr(l2 = 0jx2 = 1) (1  Pr (x2 = 1jl2 = 0; r2 = 0))2
1
2
pR Pr(l2 = 0jx2 = 0) (0  Pr (x2 = 1jl2 = 0; r2 = 0))2
In the above expression the terms that vary with R2 are those with r2 = 1 as the
decision maker could not di¤erentiate whether a 1 report comes from a biased or
unbiased R expert. Next, I look only at these terms. Also, I denote Pr (x2 = 1jl; r)
as Plr, for simplicity of notation :
TR =
1
2
pRpLL2 (1  P11)2 +
1
2
 
1  pR  1  pLL2P 211 +
1
2
pR
 
1  pLL1

(1  P01)2 + 1
2
 
1  pR  1   1  pLL2 P 201
Taking derivative with respect to R2 I get:
dTR
dR2
=
 pRpLL2 + pRpL +  1  pR  1  pLL2P11 dP11
dR2
+
   1  pLL1  pR + pR  1  pLL1 +  1  pR 1   1  pLL2 P01 dP01
dR2
If there was no possibility of bias P11 would have been
pRpL
[pRpL+(1 pR)(1 pL)] .
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However, in our case
P11 <
pRpL
[pRpL + (1  pR) (1  pL)]
due to the fact that a decision maker could not di¤erentiate between a 1 report from
a bias or from unbiased player. As a result
 pRpLL2 +

pRpL +
 
1  pR  1  pLL2P11 < 0
By a similar argument
P01 <
 
1  pLL1

pR
pR
 
1  pLL1

+ (1  pR) 1  (1  pL)L2

as the decision maker has to account for the fact that a r2 = 1 report could come
from both a biased and unbiased R. Thus,
   1  pLL1  pR + pR  1  pLL1 +  1  pR 1   1  pLL2 P01 < 0
.
Further as dP11
dR2
> 0 and dP01
dR2
, then
dE[(x2 a2)jL2 ;R2 ]
dR2
< 0.
As vGR (2) =  E [(x2   a2) j2] we can conclude that
dvGR (2)
dR2
> 0:
Next, I look at how vGR (2) changes with 
L
2 .
As the expert L is biased towards 0 for simplicity of calculations I express I will
express E [(x2   a2) j2] in terms of Pr (x = 0jl2; r2) which I denote with Qlr.
First, I look only at the terms which involve l2 = 0 as Q0r changes with 
L
2 .
TL1 =
1
2
pR
 
1  pLL2

Q201 +
1
2
 
1  pR  1   1  pLL2  (1 Q01)2 +
1
2
 
1  pR  1  pLL2 Q200 + 12pR  1   1  pLL2  (1 Q00)2
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Taking derivatives with respect to L2 , I get
dTL1
dL2
is
dTL1
dL2
=

pR
 
1  pLL2

Q01 +
 
1  pR  1   1  pLL2  (Q01   1) dQ01
dL2
+
 
1  pR  1  pLL2 Q00 + pR  1   1  pLL2  (Q00   1) dQ00
dL2
 
1
2
pRpLQ201  
1
2
 
1  pR  1  pL (1 Q01)2  
1
2
 
1  pR pLQ200   12pR  1  pL (1 Q00)2
Second, even though Q1r does not change with 
L
2 , the overall v
G
R
 
L2 ; 
R
2

changes with L2 when l2 = 1 as Q1r is multiplied by Pr(l2 = 1jx2).
Hence
dE[(x2 a2)j2]
dL2
becomes:

pR
 
1  pLL2

Q01 +
 
1  pR  1   1  pLL2  (Q01   1) dQ01
dL2
+
+
 
1  pR  1  pLL2 Q00 + pR  1   1  pLL2  (Q00   1) dQ00
dL2
+
1
2
pRpL
 
Q211  Q201

+
1
2
 
1  pR  1  pL (1 Q11)2   (1 Q01)2+
1
2
 
1  pR pL Q210  Q200+ 12pR  1  pL (1 Q10)2   (1 Q00)2
Now, dQ01
dL2
and dQ00
dL2
are positive as a 0 report from L is more trusted by the
decision maker when Ls reputation increases. Further more,
pR
 
1  pLL2

Q01 +
 
1  pR  1   1  pLL2  (Q01   1) < 0
as
Q01 <
 
1  pR  1   1  pLL2 
pR
 
1  pLL2

+ (1  pR)  1  (1  pL)L2 
which would be Pr (x2 = 0jl = 0; r = 1) in case Rs report would be unbiased. I also
used the fact that in the expression
Q01 =
 
1  pRR2
  
1   1  pLL2  
1  R2 + pRR2
  
1  pLL2

+ (1  pR)  1  (1  pL)L2 
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the term 1 p
RR2
1 R2 +pRR2
decreases with R2 for p
R  1
2
.
Similarly,
 
1  pR  1  pLL2 Q00 + pR  1   1  pLL2  (Q00   1) < 0
Thus the rst two terms in
dE[(x2 a2)j2]
dL2
are negative.
The third term in
dE[(x2 a2)j2]
dL2
is:
1
2
pRpL (Q211  Q201) + 12
 
1  pR  1  pL (1 Q11)2   (1 Q01)2 and can be
further written as :
1
2
(Q11  Q01)

2pRpL    pRpL +  1  pR  1  pL (P11 + P01)
Now
2pRpL    pRpL +  1  pR  1  pL (P11 + P01) > 0
as
P11 + P01 <
2pRpL
pRpL + (1  pR) (1  pL)
and maximum P11 is exactly
pLpR
pRpL+(1 pR)(1 pL) in the case when Rs report would be
unbiased. Furthermore the maximum P01 is
(1 pL)pR
(1 pL)pR+pL(1 pR) which is smaller than
pLpR
pRpL+(1 pR)(1 pL) as p
L  1
2
; this is the case when both R and L would give unbiased
reports.
Also, Q11  Q01  0 as we are looking at informative equilibria where the state
is correlated with the experts reports.
We can conclude that third term of
dE[(x2 a2)j2]
dL2
is non-positive.
The last term in
dE[(x2 a2)jL2 ;R2 ]
dL2
is
1
2
 
1  pR pL Q210  Q200+ 12pR  1  pL (1 Q10)2   (1 Q00)2
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which can be written as
1
2
(Q10  Q00)

2
 
1  pR pL     1  pR pL + pR  1  pL (P10 + P00)
which by similar argument is non-positive.
Putting everything together we can conclude that
dvGR (2)
dL2
 0:
Now, lets look at the value of reputation for a bad R expert.:
vBR (2) = E [a

2j2]
vBR (2) =
1
2
[Pr (l2 = 1jx2 = 0) + Pr (l2 = 1jx2 = 1)] Pr (x2 = 1jl2 = 1; r2 = 1) +
1
2
[Pr (l2 = 0jx2 = 0) + Pr (l2 = 0jx2 = 1)] Pr (x2 = 1jl2 = 0; r2 = 1)
vBR (2) =
1
2
 
1  pLL2 + pLL2 P11 + 12  1  pLL2 +  1   1  pLL2 P01
=
1
2
L2P11 +
1
2
 
1  L2

P01
It is easy to see that
dvBR (2)
dR2
> 0
as dP11
dR2
> 0 and dP01
dR2
> 0.
This is due to the fact that a bad expert might be believed more when she
declares 1 if she has a higher reputation.
Also,
vBR (2) =
1
2
L2P11 +
1
2
 
1  L2

P01
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dvBR (2)
dL2
=
1
2
(P11   P01)  1
2
L2
dP01
L2
+
1
2
dP01
L2
=
1
2
(P11   P01) + 1
2
dP01
L2
 
1  L2

As
P11   P01 =

1   1  pRR2   1  pRR2   2pL   1
1  R2 A
 
2  R2   L2 + AR2 L2

and
dP01
L2
 
1  L2

=

1  2
 
1  pR  1  pR2  1  2pL  1  L2 
2  R2   L2 + R2 L2A
2
we can conclude after some simple calculations that
dvBR (2)
dL2
> 0
The ex-ante expected payo¤of a bad R expert is a weighted reputational average
of posterior beliefs on the state when R reports 1 for sure while L could declare both
0 and 1.
When looking at the change imposed in vBR (2) by a change in 
L
2 we see that
there is a positive e¤ect coming from the fact that both reporting 1 increases the
chances of the state being 1. However there is a negative marginal e¤ect of L2 on
the probability of the state being 1 when L reports 0. However, this negative e¤ect
is lower in absolute value than the positive e¤ect and the overall e¤ect of an increase
of Ls reputation on second period ex-ante expected payo¤ of R is positive.
This result is due to the fact that a bad R expert will prefer the L expert to be
of a good type as her report will be as closed as possible to the state of the world
while an L expert will report in the opposite direction of L0s preference.
7.3 How expertsreputations are calculated
The reputation of the R is described by:
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R2 (l1; r1) =
R1 
R
G (r1jl1)
R1 
R
G (r1jl1) +
 
1  R1

RB (r1jl1)
while the reputation of L is described by:
L2 (l1; r1) =
L1
L
G (l1jr1)
L1
L
G (l1jr1) +
 
1  L1

LB (l1jr1)
Now,
Rk (r1jl1) = Rk (r1jx = 1) Pr (x = 1jl1) + Rk (r1jx = 0) Pr (x = 0jl1)
and
Lk (l1jr1) = Lk (l1jx = 1) Pr (x = 1jr1) + Rk (r1jx = 0) Pr (x = 0jr1)
Where:
Rk (1jxi) =

pRRk (xi) +
 
1  pR  Rk (1  xi)
Lk (1jxi) =

pL
 
1  Lk (xi)

+
 
1  pL  1  Lk (1  xi)
and
Rk (0jxi) =

pR
 
1  Rk (xi)

+
 
1  pR  1  Rk (1  xi)
Lk (0jxi) =

pL
 
Lk (xi)

+
 
1  pL  Lk (1  xi)
Pr (x = 1jl1) = Pr (l1jx = 1)
Pr (l1jx = 1) + Pr (l1jx = 0)
Pr (l1 = 1jx = 1) =
264 pL  L1  1  LG (1)+  1  L1   1  LB (1)+ 
1  pL  L1  1  LG (0)+  1  L1   1  LB (0)
375
Pr (l1 = 1jx = 0) =
264  1  pL  L1  1  LG (1)+  1  L1   1  LB (1)+
pL
 
L1
 
1  LG (0)

+
 
1  L1
  
1  LB (0)

375
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Pr (l1 = 0jx = 1) =
264 pL  L1 LG (1) +  1  L1  LB (1)+ 
1  pL  L1 LG (0) +  1  L1  LB (0)
375
Pr (l1 = 0jx = 0) =
264 pL  L1 LG (0) +  1  L1  LB (0)+ 
1  pL  L1 LG (1) +  1  L1  LB (1)
375
Pr (r1 = 1jx = 1) =
264 pR  R1 RG (1) +  1  R1  RB (1)
+
 
1  pR  R1 RG (0) +  1  R1  RB (0)
375
Pr (r1 = 1jx = 0) =
264 pR  R1 RG (0) +  1  R1 RB (0)
+
 
1  pR  R1 RG (1) +  1  R1  RB (1)
375
Pr (r1 = 0jx = 1) =
264 pR  R1  1  RG (1)+  1  R1   1  RB (1)
+
 
1  pR  R1  1  RG (0)+  1  R1   1  RB (0)
375
Pr (r1 = 0jx = 0) =
264 pR  R1  1  RG (0)+  1  R1   1  RB (0)
+
 
1  pR  R1  1  RG (1)+  1  R1   1  RB (1)
375
7.4 Decision Makers Optimal Decision in Equilibrium
The decision makers optimal action is the belief that the state is 1 when the messages
(l1; r1) are announced:
a1 (l1; r1) =   (1jl1; r1) =
Pr (l1; r1j1)
Pr (l1; r1j1) + Pr (l1; r1j0)
Pr (l1; r1jx1) =

R1 
R
G (r1jx1) +
 
1  R1

RB (r1jx1)
 
L1
L
G (l1jx1) +
 
1  L1

lB (l1jx1)

7.5 Proof of Claim 4
The messages sent by the experts do not inuence D0s belief about the state of the
world which is   (L1; r1) = 12 for any l1; r1  f0; 1g nor his optimal action a1 (l1; r1) =
1
2
for any l1; r1 2 f0; 1g : Thus the experts are indi¤erent between any strategies used
including these uninformative ones, thus they do not have any incentive to deviate.
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As a result these strategies which convey no information determine D0s belief and
action.
I turn next to the more interesting case when some information is transmitted
to the decision maker.
7.6 Proof of Claim 5
Assume that such an equilibrium existed then R2 (l1; r1) = 
R
1 and 
L
2 (l1; r1) = 
L
1 :
But this implies that there is no reputational cost for R of announcing 1. On the
other hand D will take a higher action after R sending a 1 message. Because a
biased R prefers a higher action there is a strict incentive to send r1 = 1. Thus
regardless of the signal the bad R will send message 1: RB (1) = 
R
B (0) = 1 which is
a contradiction. Similarly when there is no reputational cost for reporting 0 a bad
L reports it irrespective of his signal - again a contradiction.
7.7 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof 1. If sR1 = 0 then 
R
G
 
sR1 ; l1

< 0 since announcing 1 will increase the
action of the decision maker irrespective of l1 and the good R will be further from
his signal. Thus the good R will never have an incentive to announce 1 when the
signal is 0 and RG (0) = 0:
Proof 2. If sL1 = 1 then 
R
G
 
sR1 ; l1

< 0 since announcing announcing 0 will
decrease the action of the decision maker irrespective of r1 and the good R will be
farther from his signal. Thus the good L will never have an incentive of announcing
0 when the signal is 1:Thus LG (1) = 0
7.8 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof 1. I will prove the rst point by contradiction.
Suppose not and R2 (l1; 1) > 
R
2 (l1; 0); in this situation R has a both a higher
reputation by declaring 1 and a higher current payo¤ for any sR = f0; 1g; thus the
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biased R will always say 1 and RB (0) = 
R
B (1) = 1 resulting in 
R
B (0jl1) = RB (1jl1).
Then,
R2 (l1; r1) =
1
1 + 1 
R
1
R1
1
RG(r1jl1)
Now, in order to have R2 (l1; 1) > 
R
2 (l1; 0) then 
R
G (0jl1) < RG (1jl1) must be
satised. However this is not possible as a 0 report from R implies that R is of a
good type, and thus RG (0jl1) > RG (1jl1) always.
Hence, R2 (l1; 0)  R2 (l1; 1) :The one strict inequality comes from the fact that
if R2 (0; 0) = 
R
2 (0; 1) and 
R
2 (1; 0) = 
R
2 (1; 1) then the bad R will have a strict
incentive to choose 1 which leads to a babbling equilibrium
Proof 2. I look know at what is the e¤ect on Rs reputation of L changing her
report from 0 to 1.
Now,
R2 (l1; r1) =
R1 
R
G(r1jl1)
R1 
R
G(r1jl1)+(1 R1 )RB(r1jl1)
where
Rk (r1jl1) = Rk (r1jx = 0) +

Rk (r1jx = 1)  Rk (r1jx = 0)

Pr (x = 1jl1)
I will denote withAk = 
R
k (r1jx = 0)  0 andBk =

Rk (r1jx = 1)  Rk (r1jx = 0)

and X = Pr (x = 1jl1)
R2 (X) =
R1 [AG +BGX]
R1 [AG +BGX] +
 
1  R1

[AB +BBX]
or
R2 (X) =
1
1 + 1 
R
1
R1
AB+BBX
AG+BGX
=
1
1 + 1 
R
1
R1
f (X)
thus
dR2 (X)
dX
=   1
1 + 1 
R
1
R1
AB+BBX
AG+BGX
2 1  R1R1 df (X)dx
df(X)
dx
= BB
AG+BGX
  AB+BBX
(AG+BGX)
2BG =
BBAG+BBBGX ABBG BBBGX
(AG+BGX)
2 =
BBAG ABBG
(AG+BGX)
2
which is positive if BBAG   ABBG  0
Returning to the original notations this means 
R
B(r1jx=0)
RG(r1jx=0)
 RB(r1jx=1)
RG(r1jx=1)
. However
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this is always true as long as RB (1)  RG (1) and RB (0)  RG (0) which is implied
by point 1.
Lets look now at Pr (x = 1jl1) when l1 changes from 1 to 0.
I use Pr (x = 1jl1 = 0) = Pr(l1=0jx=1)Pr(l1=0jx=1)+Pr(l1=0jx=0) =
1 Pr(l1=1jx=1)
2 Pr(l1=1jx=1) Pr(l1=1jx=0) and
Pr (x = 1jl1 = 1) = Pr(l1=1jx=1)Pr(l1=1jx=1)+Pr(l1=1jx=0) .
Further Pr (x = 1jl1 = 1)  Pr (x = 1jl1 = 0) can be written as Pr (l1 = 1jx1 = 1) 
Pr (l1 = 1jx1 = 0) or Pr (l1 = 0jx1 = 0)  Pr (l1 = 0jx1 = 1) as the states are equally
likely.
By direct substitution I nd the cut-o¤ point :

L
1 =
LB (0)  LB (1)
LG (0) + 
L
B (1)  LB (0)
such that if L1  L1 i¤Pr (x = 1jl1 = 1)  Pr (x = 1jl1 = 0) or Pr (l1 = 1jx1 = 1) 
Pr (l1 = 1jx1 = 0) or Pr (l1 = 0jx1 = 0)  Pr (l1 = 0jx1 = 1)
I¤ L1 < 
L
1 then Pr (x = 1jl1 = 1) < Pr (x = 1jl1 = 0) or Pr (l1 = 1jx1 = 1) <
Pr (l1 = 1jx1 = 0) or Pr (l1 = 0jx1 = 0) < Pr (l1 = 0jx1 = 1) :
7.9 Proof of Proposition 5
Lets assume that this equilibrium exists: RG (1) = 1; 
R
G (0) = 0 and 
L
G (1) = 0;
LG (0) = 1. As we have seen in the claim above it cannot be the case that the
bad expert also tells the truth always. In any informative equilibrium we know
that the posterior reputation of an R expert after announcing 0 must be higher
irrespective of the L0s report. Thus R2 (1; 0)  R2 (1; 1) and R2 (0; 0)  R2 (0; 1)
with a strict inequality, translates into RB (1)  RG (1) and RB (0)  RG (0) with one
strict inequality. But if good R tells the truth in equilibrium this implies RB (1) = 1
and RB (0) > 0.
Next we look for the equilibrium strategies of the bad experts. The expected
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current benet from lying of a bad R when her private signal is 0 is:
RB
 
l1 = i; s
R
1 = 0

= RB(a

1 (i; 1))  RB(a1 (i; 0))
While her reputation cost of lying when observing signal 0 is:
RRB
 
l1 = i; s
R
1 = 0

= vBR (l1 = i; r1 = 0)  vBR (l1 = i; r1 = 1)
Her equilibrium strategy RB (0) is determined by the indi¤erence condition be-
tween the current benet versus the future reputational costs taking into account
what L does:
1P
i=0
 
1  pRPr (l1 = ijx1 = 1) + pR Pr (l1 = ijx1 = 0)RB  l1 = i; sR1 = 0 =
1P
i=0
 
1  pRPr (l1 = ijx1 = 1) + pR Pr (l1 = ijx1 = 0)RRB  l1 = i; sR1 = 0
In the same time a bad L equilibrium strategy LB (1) is determined by the
indi¤erence condition between L0s expected current benet and her expected future
cost:
1P
i=0
 
1  pLPr (r1 = ijx1 = 0) + pL Pr (r1 = ijx1 = 1) LB  r1 = i; sL1 = 1 =
1P
i=0
 
1  pLPr (r1 = ijx1 = 0) + pL Pr (r1 = ijx1 = 1) RLB  r1 = i; sL1 = 1
If RBs current benets from lying are greater or equal to her future reputation
costs for all RB (0) 2 (0; 1] then the optimum strategy is RB (0) = 1. Similarly if
LBs current benets from lying are greater or equal to her future reputation costs
for all LB (1) 2 (0; 1] then the optimum strategy is LB (1) = 1.
The optimal values RB (0) and 
L
B (1) are determined simultaneous.
RB (0) and 
L
B (1) are unique as the RBs overall net current benet from lying
denoted as NBLRB:
1P
i=0
 
1  pRPr (l1 = ijx1 = 1) + pR Pr (l1 = ijx1 = 0)RB  l1 = i; sR1 = 0 
1P
i=0
 
1  pRPr (l1 = ijx1 = 1) + pR Pr (l1 = ijx1 = 0)RRB  l1 = i; sR1 = 0 strictly
decreases with RB (0) keeping 
L
B (1) xed.
This is due to the fact that the rst term in NBLRB is strictly decreasing in
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RB (0) as
dRB(l1=i;sR1 =0)
RB(0)
< 0 while RRB
 
l1 = i; s
R
1 = 0

is
strictly increasing in RB (0).
While the rst derivative is straightforward, the second result is due to the fact
that
dRRB(l1=i;sR1 =0)
RB(0)
=
dvBR (l1; r1 = 0)
dR2 (l1; r1 = 0)| {z }
>0
dR2 (l1; r1 = 0)
dRB (0)| {z }
<0
 dv
B
R (l1; r1 = 1)
dR2 (l1; r1 = 1)| {z }
>0
dR2 (l1; r1 = 1)
dRB (0)| {z }
>0
+
+
dvBR (l1; r1 = 0)
dL2 (l1; r1 = 0)| {z }
>0
dL2 (l1; r1 = 0)
dRB (0)| {z }
<0
  dv
B
R (l1; r1 = 1)
dL2 (l1; r1 = 1)| {z }
>0
dL2 (l1; r1 = 1)
dRB (0)| {z }
>0
.
Its important to see that d
L
2 (l1;r1=1)
dRB(0)
> 0 as d
L
2 (l1;r1)
dPr(x=0jr) > 0 and
dPr(x1=0jr1=1)
dRB(0)
=
(1 R1 )(2pR 1)
(1+(1 R1 )RB(0))
2 > 0; thus
dvBR (l1;r1=1)
dR2 (l1;r1=1)
dR2 (l1;r1=1)
dRB(0)
> 0
Also, d
R
2 (l1;r1=0)
dRB(0)
< 0 as as d
L
2 (l1;r1)
dPr(x=0jr) > 0 and
dPr(x1=0jr1=0)
dRB(0)
< 0.
Thus dv
B
R (l1;r1=0)
dR2 (l1;r1=0)
dR2 (l1;r1=0)
dRB(0)
< 0.
I follow a similar procedure in order to show dv
B
R (l1;r1=0)
dL2 (l1;r1=0)
dL2 (l1;r1=0)
dRB(0)
< 0 and
dvBR (l1;r1=1)
dL2 (l1;r1=1)
dL2 (l1;r1=1)
dRB(0)
> 0
Similarly, keeping RB (0) xed LB
s net current benet from lying, denoted as
(NBLLB):
1P
i=0
 
1  pLPr (r1 = ijx1 = 0) + pL Pr (r1 = ijx1 = 1) LB  r1 = i; sL1 = 1 
1P
i=0
 
1  pLPr (r1 = ijx1 = 0)+pL Pr (r1 = ijx1 = 1) RLB  r1 = i; sL1 = 1 also strictly
decreases with LB (1).keeping 
R
B (0) xed.
The monotonic properties of these functions imply that RB (0) and 
L
B (1) strate-
gies - solutions to the indi¤erence conditions, are unique for a xed counterpart
strategy. Furthermore, this translates into unique solutions to the above system
of two (di¤erent) equations with two unknowns. RB (0) and 
L
B (1) are parameter
(R1 ; 
L
1 ) sensitive.
Further, I look under what conditions the good experts optimally decides to tell
the truth. We saw in Proposition 2 that a good R always tells the truth when she
receives signal 0 while a good L tells the truth when the signal received is 1. This is
due to the fact that they get an improvement in their reputation with no additional
current cost. The problem arises when R0s private signal is 1 and when L0s private
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signal is 0. For having a truthtelling equilibrium i.e. RG (1) = 1 and 
L
G (0) = 1
in which no political correctness takes place then the expertsnet current benets
from telling the truth have to be positive for both the good experts
Rs current benet from telling the truth when sR1 = 1 is
RG
 
l1 = i; s
R
1 = 1

= RG

uRG
 
i; 1; sR1 = 1
  uRG  i; 0; sR1 = 1
while her reputation cost from reporting 1 is
RRG
 
l1 = i; s
R
1 = 1

= vGR (l1 = i; r1 = 0)  vGR (l1 = i; r1 = 1)
Ls current benet from telling the truth when sL1 = 0 is
LG
 
r1 = i; s
L
1 = 0

= LG

uLG
 
i; 0; sL1 = 0
  uRG  i; 1; sL1 = 0
while her reputation cost from reporting l1 = 0 is
RLG
 
r1 = i; s
L
1 = 0

= vGR (l1 = 1; r1 = i)  vGR (l1 = 0; r1 = i)
It is necessary and su¢ cient that the current gain of telling the truth is greater
or equal with the future reputation cost of telling the truth (for both R and L). For
any parameter (R1 ; 
L
1 ) we can nd thresholds for the time preference parameters
RG and LG such that RG > RG and LG > LG the truthtelling inequalities hold
and there exists an equilibrium in which the good experts always tell the truth. RG
and LG are found as solutions to the system of equations:
1P
i=0
 
1  pRPr (l1 = ijx1 = 0) + pR Pr (l1 = ijx1 = 1)RG  l1 = i; sR1 = 1 =
1P
i=0
 
1  pRPr (l1 = ijx1 = 0) + pR Pr (l1 = ijx1 = 1)RRB  l1 = i; sR1 = 1;
1P
i=0
 
1  pLPr (r1 = ijx1 = 1) + pL Pr (r1 = ijx1 = 0) LG  r1 = i; sL1 = 0 =
1P
i=0
 
1  pLPr (r1 = ijx1 = 1) + pL Pr (r1 = ijx1 = 0) RLG  r1 = i; sL1 = 0.
53
7.10 Proof of Proposition 6
To determine the equilibrium existence in the general case I follow the same proce-
dure as in the truthtelling equilibrium with the di¤erence that I capture both the
bad expertsdiscipline e¤ect but also the good expertspolitical correctness.
The good experts report always truthfully when their signal is opposite their
possible bias. However a di¤erent situation arrises when they get a signal similar to
their bias. Lets look rst at the good R optimal strategy when sR1 = 1.
Rs current benet from telling the truth when sR1 = 1 is
RG
 
l1 = i; s
R
1 = 1

= RG

u^RG
 
i; 1; sR1 = 1
  u^RG  i; 0; sR1 = 1
while her reputation cost from reporting 1 is
RRG
 
l1 = i; s
R
1 = 1

= vGR (l1 = i; r1 = 1)  vGR (l1 = i; r1 = 0)
So, there always exists a threshold RG 2 R+ such that:
1P
i=0
 
1  pRPr (l1 = ijx1 = 0) + pR Pr (l1 = ijx1 = 1)RG  l1 = i; sR1 = 1 =
1P
i=0
 
1  pRPr (l1 = ijx1 = 0) + pR Pr (l1 = ijx1 = 1)RRG  l1 = i; sR1 = 1 since
RG is just a linear operator. This means that an R expert of good type is indi¤erent
between reporting her signal or not. As her current payo¤ is strictly increasing in
RG, if RG > RG R always tells the truth as the current benet is higher than
future reputation costs for all RG (1) 2 [0; 1] thus RG (1) = 1 . If RG  RG the
good R does not always tell the truth. In order to nd good R equilibrium strategy
we x RG to a value below the threshold and we calculate RG (1) 2 [0; 1) which
makes a good R indi¤erent between telling the truth and not.
The same reasoning applies to the L expert of a good type:
If a good expert L receives signal sL1 = 0 there always exists a threshold 
LG 2 R+
such that:
1P
i=0
 
1  pLPr (l1 = ijx1 = 1) + pL Pr (r1 = ijx1 = 0)LG  r1 = i; sL1 = 0 =
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1P
i=0
 
1  pLPr (l1 = ijx1 = 1) + pL Pr (r1 = ijx1 = 0)RLG (r1 = i; s11 = 0)
which makes the good L expert indi¤erent between reporting her signal or not.
As her current payo¤ is strictly increasing in LG, if LG > LG there is always
truthtelling in equilibrium and LG (0) = 1. If 
LG  LG the good L does not always
tell the truth. LG (0) 2 [0; 1) is determined by the above indi¤erence condition.
As before the bad expert equilibrium strategies are determined at the indi¤erence
conditions between current benets versus future reputation costs.
Bad Rs equilibrium strategy when her signal is 0, RB (0) is determined by:
1P
i=0
 
1  pRPr (l1 = ijx1 = 1) + pR Pr (l1 = ijx1 = 0)RB  l1 = i; sR1 = 0 =
1P
i=0
 
1  pRPr (l1 = ijx1 = 1) + pR Pr (l1 = ijx1 = 0)RRB  l1 = i; sR1 = 0.
while RB (1) is determined by:
1P
i=0
 
1  pRPr (l1 = ijx1 = 0) + pR Pr (l1 = ijx1 = 1)RB  l1 = i; sR1 = 1 =
1P
i=0
 
1  pRPr (l1 = ijx1 = 0) + pR Pr (l1 = ijx1 = 1)RRB  l1 = i; sR1 = 1.
When the bad expert L receives signal 0 the equilibrium strategy LB (0) is
determined by:
1P
i=0
 
1  pLPr (l1 = ijx1 = 1) + pL Pr (r1 = ijx1 = 0)LB  r1 = i; sL1 = 0 =
1P
i=0
 
1  pLPr (l1 = ijx1 = 1) + pL Pr (r1 = ijx1 = 0)RLB (r1 = i; s11 = 0).
and LB (1) is determined by:
1P
i=0
 
1  pLPr (l1 = ijx1 = 0) + pL Pr (r1 = ijx1 = 1)LB  r1 = i; sL1 = 1 =
1P
i=0
 
1  pLPr (l1 = ijx1 = 0) + pL Pr (r1 = ijx1 = 1)RLB (r1 = i; s11 = 1).
The equilibrium strategies will be determined simultaneously by the above six
indi¤erence conditions.:
The non-informative equilibrium arrises in the situation in which political cor-
rectness takes full hold of good experts behavior. As a result no expert ever declares
her possible bias. The lower weight bounds RG and LG which trigger this type of
non-informative equilibrium are given by the indi¤erence conditions:
1P
i=0
 
1  pRPr (l1 = ijx1 = 0) + pR Pr (l1 = ijx1 = 1)RG  l1 = i; sR1 = 1 =
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1P
i=0
 
1  pRPr (l1 = ijx1 = 0) + pR Pr (l1 = ijx1 = 1)RRG  l1 = i; sR1 = 1
evaluated at babbling strategies RG (0) = 
R
G (1) = 
R
B (1) = 
R
B (0) =
1
2
and
1P
i=0
 
1  pLPr (l1 = ijx1 = 1) + pL Pr (r1 = ijx1 = 0)LG  r1 = i; sL1 = 0 =
1P
i=0
 
1  pLPr (l1 = ijx1 = 1) + pL Pr (r1 = ijx1 = 0)RLG (r1 = i; s11 = 0)
evaluated at babbling strategies LG (0) = 
L
G (1) = 
L
B (1) = 
L
B (0) =
1
2
.
7.11 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof 1. The rst proof follows the same logic of the proof in the original case
I will prove the rst point by contradiction.
Suppose not and R2 (1) > 
R
2 (0); in this situation a bad R has a both a higher
reputation by declaring 1 and a higher current payo¤ for any sR1 = f0; 1g; thus the
biased R will always say 1 and RB (0) = 
R
B (1) = 1 resulting in 
R
B (0) = 
R
B (1) = 1.
Then,
R2 (r1) =
1
1 + 1 
R
1
R1
1
RG(r1)
Now, in order to have R2 (1) > 
R
2 (0) then 
R
G (0) < 
R
G (1) must be satised.
However this is not possible as a 0 report from R implies that R is of a good type,
and thus RG (0) > 
R
G (1) always.
Hence, R2 (0) > 
R
2 (1) :
Proof 2. Now,
R2 (r1) =
R1 
R
G (r1)
R1 
R
G (r1) +
 
1  R1

RB (r1)
where
Rk (r1) = 
R
k (r1jx = 0) +

Rk (r1jx = 1)  Rk (r1jx = 0)

(1  )
As long as 
R
B(r1jx=0)
RG(r1jx=0)
 RB(r1jx=1)
RG(r1jx=1)
, which is implied by Proposition 7:1, d
R
2 (r1)
d
< 0.
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7.12 Proof of Proposition 8
Proof 2. Now,
R2 (l1; r1) =
R1 
R
G (r1jl1)
R1 
R
G (r1jl1) +
 
1  R1

RB (r1jl1)
where
Rk (r1) = 
R
k (r1jx = 0) +

Rk (r1jx = 1)  Rk (r1jx = 0)

Pr (x1 = 1jl1)
As long as 
R
B(r1jl1=0)
RG(r1jl1=0)
 RB(r1jl1=1)
RG(r1jl1=1)
, which is implied by Proposition 8:1, R2 (1; r1) 
R2 (0; r1) if Pr (x1 = 1jl1 = 1)  Pr (x1 = 1jl1 = 0). But as L is not biased
Pr (x1 = 1jl1 = 1) = p
L (1  )
pL (1  ) + (1  pL) 
Pr (x1 = 1jl1 = 0) =
 
1  pL (1  )
(1  pL) (1  ) + pL
if we also allow for a prior on the state - Pr (x1 = 0) =  . But if pL  12 then
Pr (x1 = 1jl1 = 1)  Pr (x1 = 1jl1 = 0) always and thus conformity as separation
disappears.
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Chapter 2
Conforming to Stand Out: Comparative Statics
1 Comparative Statics
In this chapter I look at how the expertsoptimal strategies change with their own
and counterparts time preferences, initial reputations and signal precisions.
The change with respect to the time preference parameters is derived analytically
but I also provide a numerical example.
The e¤ect of a change in initial reputations and signal precisions are explained
with numerical examples.
First, I look at the implication for the truthtelling equilibrium. As the good
experts always tell the truth in a truthtelling equilibrium, these implications are
derived for to the bad expert equilibrium behavior.
1.1 Bad ExpertsOptimal Strategies: Comparative Statics
First I analyze the e¤ect of a change in experts time preferences on the bad
expertsoptimal strategies. The biased expertsoptimal strategies when their signals
are opposite their potential biases are determined by the indi¤erence conditions
between telling the truth versus lying. The following result is obtained by applying
multivariate implicit function theorem on these indi¤erence conditions.
Result 3 The change of the optimal strategies with the parameters of time prefer-
ence is
diB (1  bi)
diB
> 0 and
diB (1  bi)
d{B
> 0
The rst inequality conveys the fact that if a bad expert values the future less
she lies more and vice-versa - she lies less if she values the future more. Furthermore
this translates in an overall discipline e¤ect for the bad experts: an bad expert lie
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less as she cares more about the future, while the counterpart also lies less as she
cannot a¤ord to loose further reputation in the future.
I look next at numerical example with initial parameters: R1 = 
L
1 = 0:6,
pR = pL = 0:75. I allow the bad L expert to vary his time preference parameter
LB1 from 0:1 to 0:25.
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
mB
L
pR=pL=0.75, l1
R=l1
L=0.6, mB
R=0.25
pB
R(0)
pB
L(1)
Fig. 1: Equilibrium strategies at di¤erent time preferences
Fig. 1 plots the optimal strategies of the bad experts at these particular pa-
rameter values. We observe that once L values the future more (at lower values of
LB1 ) she lie less in equilibrium and so does her counterpart R. This result has an
important applicability in the sense that a decision maker could make two experts
(which he suspects of being of bad type) tell the truth in equilibrium not necessarily
by disciplining both of them but by disciplining just one.
I also look next (through a numerical example) at how the optimal strategies
of the bad experts change with the initial reputation of L. Initially, I allow for Ls
initial reputation to vary monotonically from 0 to 1 while Rs reputation is xed at
0:6. The other parameters take values: pR = pL = 0:75, RB = LB = 0:25.
If Ls initial reputation L1 increases, (Fig. 2a) a bad L lies more in equilibrium
as a higher reputation makes her more believable in the eyes of the decision maker.
As a result more 0 reports from L will be seen in equilibrium. At the same time a bad
R lies less in equilibrium as Ls reputation increases; this is due to Rs realization
that D takes both reports into account when he decides on his action. A report
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of 1 from R might not have much weight in her current payo¤ but a report of 0
signicantly increases her next period payo¤. Thus it is better for R to lie less once
Ls reputation increases.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
lL1
pL=pR=0.75 and mRB = m
L
B = 0.25
pRB(0)
pLB(1)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
lL1
pL=0.75, pR=0.51 and mRB = m
L
B = 0.25
pRB(0)
pLB(1)
Fig. 2: Equilibrium strategies at di¤erent initial reputation levels
Next, I change the signal precision for R monotonically from pR = 0:51 to 0:99
We see in Fig. 3. that a bad R expert now lies more as she realizes that the decision
maker accounts for her less precise signal when observing a 1 report from her. This
in return implies a lesser ability of D to di¤erentiate between a bad and good expert
and thus R lies more. If R has a lower precision than L, a bad L also lies more in
equilibrium as she accounts for the fact that the decision maker understands that a
higher precision of Ls signal implies a more accurate report.
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Fig. 3: Equilibrium strategies at di¤erent precision level
Thus, lower signal precision translates in higher inability of the decision maker
to di¤erentiate between a good expert that tells the truth versus a bad expert that
lies; thus a bad experts is able to lie more.
In the above discussion we assumed that the good experts tell the truth in
equilibrium. However, the good experts also have incentives to misreport their signals
when the signals are their perceived biases. Next I look at the implications of changes
of parameters for the good expertsbehavior in equilibrium.
1.2 Good Experts Optimal Strategies: Comparative Statics
In Chapter 1 I found and characterized the equilibrium of the model. The truthtelling
equilibrium was determined by computing the optimal weights RG and LG which
made the good experts tell the truth with probability 1 when their signals were their
potential biases. Once the good experts value the future more they start distorting
their reports for fear of being identied as biased. Thus for RG  RG or/and
LG  LG the equilibrium will be just informative.
Next, I look at the e¤ect of a change in experts time preferences on the good
expertsoptimal strategies. These e¤ect is capture trough the change in RG and
LG.
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In Fig. 4 I present the optimal thresholds above which the good experts disclose
truthfully their signal. For values below these weights the good experts lie with
some positive probability when the signal is their possible bias. They are calculated
at initial parameters: R1 = 
L
1 = 0:6, p
R = pL = 0:75, RB = 1
4
and LB varies from
0:1 to 0:25:
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0.04
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R=0.25
mG
R
mG
L
Fig. 4: Optimal time preference parameters for the good experts for LB
We see that if a bad L puts a weight of 0:1 on the present than a good L needs to
put a weight of approximately 0:05 or more on the present in order for a truthtelling
equilibrium to exist. However when the bad L starts valuing the present more (i.e.
LB increases), the optimal threshold LG for a truthtelling equilibrium increases
as well. Which means that if the good L values the present at the same value as
before at LG = 0:05 the equilibrium is not a truthtelling one anymore, so the good
L expert will lie with positive probability when her signal is 0 - her potential bias:
This result is due to fact that the decision maker sees more 0 in equilibrium
which he assumes to be from a biased expert as LB increases. The good L by
reporting 1 shows that she is not biased so there is an extra incentive to report the
potential bias so LG (0) (probability of lying of a good expert) increases with 
LB.
We see however that RG decreases when the bad expert values the present
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more. The good R tells the truth at lower values of RG, so the incentive to lie for
reputational reason (RG (1)) decreases with 
LB. This result is could be due to the
fact that the decision maker realizes that the bad L lies more when he values the
present more, so he puts more weight on Rs report.
In Fig. 5 I represent the optimal thresholds above which the good experts disclose
truthfully their signal when the initial reputation of L changes. They are calculated
at initial parameters: R1 = 0:6, p
R = pL = 0:75, RB = 1
4
and LB = 1
10
while L1
varies from 0 to 1.
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Fig. 5: Optimal time preference parameters for the good experts at di¤erent L1
We see that if the bad L initial reputation increases both LG and RG increase
and thus we observe an extra incentives of lying for the good experts: LG (0) and
RG (1) increase with with 
L
1 .
The reasoning for these results is the fact that if the initial reputation of L
increases, then a bad R lies less (when signal 1). As a result, it is harder for the
decision maker to di¤erentiate between a bad R and a good expert R. In this case,
it is easier for a good R to report 0 when in fact the signal received was 1. This
could summarize into the argument that a higher initial reputation for L implies
more signal distortion for the good R. So the good R has an extra incentive to lie
for reputational reasons i.e. RG (1) increases with 
L
1 .
Also if L1 increases, a bad L reports 0 more, so more zeros will be observed in
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equilibrium. The good L by reporting 1 shows that he is not biased so there is an
extra incentive to report against the potential bias so LG (0) increases with 
L
1 as
well.
Fig. 6 presents the optimal thresholds above which the good experts disclose
truthfully their signal when the signal precision of R changes. They are calculated
at initial parameters: R1 = 0:6, p
L = 0:75, RB = LB = 1
4
and LB = 1
4
while pR
varies from 0:51 to 0:99.
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Fig. 6: Optimal time preference parameters for the good experts at di¤erent pR
When Rs signal precision increases RG increases in pR, so a good R distorts
her signal (i.e. RG (1) increases in p
R). After a threshold RG decreases with pR as
R does not need to build-up her future reputation anymore as she has a good signal
which is known by the decision maker and allows her to focus on the current payo¤.
We see that when Rs signal precision increases a good L realizes she needs to
counteract Rs higher reputation triggered by better signal - so LG (0) decreases with
pR and LG decreases with pR. Also there is an inexion point at approximately
pR = 0:75: for values of pR < pL = 0:75, LG is convex while afterwards it becomes
concave. This captures the fact that the rate of change of signal distortion increases
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with the counterparts precision for pR < pL; once R0s signal becomes more precise
i.e. pR > pL this rate of change decreases with pR.
2 Conformity as Separation E¤ect
In the previous chapter we saw that conformity as separation represents an action
to disavow ones bias when the counterpart has a reputation below a particular
threshold.
For pR = pL = 0:75, RB = LB = 1
4
, R1 = 0:6 and 
L
1 2 (0; 1), I calculate the
reputational threshold L1 based on which R conforms to separate in a truthtelling
equilibrium.
Fig. 7 plots Ls actual initial reputation against the optimal cut-o¤ point L1
evaluated at equilibrium strategies. At low levels of Ls initial reputation (when
L1 <

L
1 ) R gets a higher reputation by reporting 0 when L reports 0 rather than
when L reports 1 - this is the conformity as separation e¤ect
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Fig. 7: Conformity as Separation
This e¤ect, however has be analyzed in the context that 0 reports from L are
not seen often by the decision maker - as an L with low initial reputation prefers to
tell 1 to increase her future reputation.
For the same parameter values (and thus, the same equilibrium strategies) I look
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for the same e¤ect in Ls behavior. Rs actual initial reputation is R1 = 0:6 while
the cut-o¤ optimal R1 varies with 
L
1 as well.
As Rs initial reputation is high in comparison with most of Ls initial reputation
values, L0s conformity as separation behavior can be seen only at high levels of L1 .
If L1 = 0:6 and 
R
1 = 0:6 the cut-o¤ points 
R
1 =

L
1 . At this particular level of
expertsinitial reputations there is no conformity as separation e¤ect in equilibrium.
3 Welfare Analysis
By increasing the reputation of one expert, we observe two opposite e¤ects on
the equilibrium strategies of the bad experts. First, the expert whose reputation
increases lies more; however, her counterpart lies less. Hence, an obvious question is
what is the predominant e¤ect on the decision makers payo¤. In Figure 8 I plot Ds
ex-ante rst stage expected payo¤ at parameter values R1 = 0:6, p
R = pL = 0:75,
RB = 1
4
and LB = 1
10
.
Even though there is a trade-o¤ between one expert being disciplined to tell
the truth e¤ect versus the other one lying more, we see that there is a positive
overall e¤ect on Ds expected payo¤ in period 1. Hence, by increasing one experts
reputation the positive discipline e¤ect on the counterparts action overcomes the
negative e¤ect of the lying by the rst expert.
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Fig. 8: Decision Makers Expected Payo¤
If we also increase R1 there is an upward shift of Ds expected payo¤; thus the
decision maker would prefer to have both of the experts with reputations as high as
possible.
Notice that I look only at the rst period decision makers payo¤ as the second
stage payo¤ is not a¤ected by expertscareer concerns.
In general due to the career concerns of the experts we also see a di¤erent trade-
o¤ taking place in equilibrium: the bad experts declare their signals with some
positive probability, while the good experts misreport their signal with some positive
probability. The overall e¤ect on the decision makers payo¤ could be either positive
or negative and it depends on expertstime preferences.
4 Conclusion
This model attempts to shed light in the e¢ ciency of communication when advice
is provided by two experts who care about their future advancement, and have
uncertain opposing biases while the decision maker is unable to veriability the
state of the world.
In a truthtelling equilibrium where the good experts are always telling the truth,
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a decision maker could discipline both experts to disclose their signals, in case he
suspects that they are of a bad type by o¤ering making only one expert to value the
future more and not to both. Career concerns in this case makes the expert that
did not receive any incentive to tell the truth as otherwise she will get a lower pay
in the future since the counterpart will become even more trustworthy than her.
Another important result comes from expertsability to observe the true state.
If the precision of their signal drops bad experts are more likely to lie in equilibrium
as the decision maker is unable to di¤erentiate between a good expert that got a
wrong signal and a bad expert that lies. Also, if the signal of one expert increases,
the counterpart (in case she is of a good type) will not distort her signal only as long
as her signal precision is higher than her competitors This perspective should also
be taken into account by a decision maker that ranks di¤erent experts - for example
nancial or economic advisers - when the environment is volatile or goes through
adjustments.
Another negative e¤ect occurs in an informative equilibrium when a decision
maker is able to pick one expert with a higher reputation, then the counterpart (if
she is of a good type) tends to misreport her signal in order not to appear biased.
As a result, biased information might be transmitted to the decision maker. On the
positive side, if the counterpart is of a bad type, she is likely to tell her signal more
often than before.
As this model is build on Morris (2001) a pertinent question is whether the
decision maker is better o¤ by asking advice from two experts which are from
opposing sides. While the results found by Morris still persist: disavowing own bias
for reputational reasons - which translates in discipline of bad experts and perverse
incentive for lying of good experts, this study brings into attention a further type
of distortion due to the strategic interaction of experts - conformity as separation.
However, the overall e¤ect of adding of one more expert is not clear, and it depends
on the level of career concerns of each expert. While there is a further discipline
e¤ect on the bad experts, the negative e¤ects on the good experts persists as they
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are incentivized to lie even more for reputation reasons.
There are papers related to this model which analyses communication by mul-
tiple experts, for example: Austen-Smith (1990, 1993), Krishna and Morgan (2001
a,b), Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989), Wolinsky (2002). These papers build on the
seminal paper of Crawford and Sobel (1982) by adding one more expert to the
communication. The expert advice could be simultaneous or sequential, experts
could have similar biases or not. In these papers however the biases of the experts
are common knowledge. Li (2010) adds to the literature by looking at the e¢ ciency
of two expert communication when there is asymmetric information about the biases
of the experts.
My study contributes to the literature on communication by multiple experts
to an uninformed policy maker by analyzing the information transmission by two
experts motivated by career concerns. The experts are imperfectly informed and
there is uncertainty about their biases. As in the benchmark model - Morris (2001),
the factors that can induce di¤erent results in the welfare of the decision maker are
the career concerns of the experts. The overall e¤ect is determined by the trade-o¤s
implied by the manner in which the experts value the future.
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5 Appendix
While proving uniqueness of the truthtelling equilibrium we saw that the net benet
of lying for one expert decreases in her probability of lying in case she is biased,
keeping the counterparts strategy xed. dNBLRB
RB(0)
< 0 for any LB (1) xed and
similarly dNBLLB
LB(1)
< 0 for any RB (0) xed. This result says that the net benet of
lying for each expert is a monotonic function in own strategy.
In order to be able to look at the comparative statics of the optimal strategies
with respect to the parameters of the model, I need to ask rst how the net benet
of lying changes with the counterpart probability of lying keeping own strategy
xeddNBLRB
LB(1)
for any RB (0).
I prove next the following intermediary result:
Result 4 Keeping own strategy xed, RB (0), a bad R net benet of lying is increas-
ing in the probability of lying of the counterpart (in case she is biased) dNBLRB
LB(1)
> 0
for any RB (0).
As a reminder, NBLRB is:
1P
i=0
 
1  pRPr (l1 = ijx1 = 1) + pR Pr (l1 = ijx1 = 0)RB  l1 = i; sR1 = 0 
1P
i=0
 
1  pRPr (l1 = ijx1 = 1) + pR Pr (l1 = ijx1 = 0)RRB  l1 = i; sR1 = 0
First, I look at the change of the bad R current benet from lying - the rst term
of NBLRB - with respect to LB (1). The bad R benet from lying I denote with
BLRB. The rst term of BLRB (i.e. l1 = 0) di¤erentiated with respect to LB (1) is:
d[(1 pR) Pr(l1=0jx1=1)+pR Pr(l1=0jx1=0)]
dLB(1)
RB
 
l1 = 0; s
R
1 = 0

+ 
1  pRPr (l1 = 0jx1 = 1) + pR Pr (l1 = 0jx1 = 0) dRB(l1=0;sR1 =0)dLB(1) .
This is positive as:
d[(1 pR) Pr(l1=0jx1=1)+pR Pr(l1=0jx1=0)]
dLB(1)
=
 
1  pR pL  1  L1 +  1  pLL1 > 0.
The term
dRB
 
l1 = 0; s
R
1 = 0

dLB (1)
=
d

RB(a1 (0; 1))  RB(a1 (0; 0))

dLB (1)
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is positive as well as:
da1 (0; 1)
dLB (1)
=   1
(Pr (0; 1j1) + Pr (0; 1j0))2AB > 0
A =
 
1  L1
 
R1 
R
G (1j1) +
 
1  R1

RB (1j1)


R1 
R
G (1j0) +
 
1  R1

RB (1j0)

B =
 
1  pL L1LG (0j1) +  1  L1 LB (0j1) 
pL

L1
L
G (0j0) +
 
1  L1

LB (0j0)

.
A is positive whileB simplies at
 
1  2pL < 0.
In nding this result I used that
Pr (0; 1j0) = R1 RG (1j0) +  1  R1 RB (1j0) L1LG (0j0) +  1  L1 LB (0j0)
and
Pr (0; 1j1) = R1 RG (1j1) +  1  R1 RB (1j1) L1LG (0j1) +  1  L1 LB (1j1)
Similarly,
da1 (0; 0)
dLB (1)
=   1
(Pr (0; 0j1) + Pr (0; 0j0))2AB < 0
A =
 
1  L1
 
R1 
R
G (0j1) +
 
1  R1

RB (0j1)


R1 
R
G (0j0) +
 
1  R1

RB (0j0)

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B = pL

L1
L
G (0j1) +
 
1  L1

LB (0j1)
  
1  pL L1LG (0j0) +  1  L1 LB (0j0)
A is positive and B simplies at
 
2pL   1 > 0.
The change of the second term of BLRB with respect to LB (1) is:
d
 
1  pRPr (l1 = 1jx1 = 1) + pR Pr (l1 = 1jx1 = 0)
dLB (1)
RB
 
l1 = 1; s
R
1 = 0

+
 
1  pRPr (l1 = 1jx1 = 1) + pR Pr (l1 = 1jx1 = 0) dRB  l1 = 1; sR1 = 0
dLB (1)
d[(1 pR) Pr(l1=1jx1=1)+pR Pr(l1=1jx1=0)]
dLB(1)
=    1  pR pL  1  L1   1  pLL1 which
is negative.
Furthermore:
dRB
 
l1 = 1; s
R
1 = 0

dLB (1)
=
d

RB(a1 (1; 1))  RB(a1 (1; 0))

dLB (1)
> 0
as:
da1 (1; 1)
dLB (1)
=   1
(Pr (1; 1j1) + Pr (1; 1j0))2AB > 0
A =
 
1  L1
 
R1 
R
G (1j1) +
 
1  R1

RB (1j1)


R1 
R
G (1j0) +
 
1  R1

RB (1j0)

B = 1  2pL < 0:
However,
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da1 (1; 0)
dLB (1)
=   1
(Pr (1; 0j1) + Pr (1; 0j0))2AB < 0
as
A =
 
1  L1
 
R1 
R
G (0j1) +
 
1  R1

RB (0j1)


R1 
R
G (0j0) +
 
1  R1

RB (0j0)

B = 2pL   1 > 0
The result
dRB
 
l1 = 1; s
R
1 = 0

dLB (1)
=
d

RB(a1 (1; 1))  RB(a1 (1; 0))

dLB (1)
> 0
conveys that as the counterpart L is more likely to tell a lie when receiving signal 1
(in case L is biased , seeing 1 from L is more likely to be the truth which reinforce
Rs report of 1 irrespective whether this is the truth or not. The is the extreme case
that a bad L lies always so a 1 report means that L is good for sure.
Putting everything together however we get that the change of the second term
of BLRB (i.e. l1 = 1) with respect to LB (1) is positive as. The negative e¤ect
coming from
 
1  pRPr (l1 = 1jx1 = 1) + pR Pr (l1 = 1jx1 = 0) when L lies more is
not enough to cancel the reinforcement e¤ect of a report of 1 coming from L.
We can conclude thus that the change of BLRB with respect to LB (1) is positive.
The change of the bad R reputational cost of lying (denoted as CLRB) with
respect to LB (1) can be shown to be negative. This is due to two factors:
1. dv
B
R(l1=0;r1)
dLB(1)
=
dvBR (l1= 0; r1)
dR2 (l1= 0; r1)| {z }
>0
dR2 (l1= 0; r1)
dLB (1)| {z }
<0
+
dvBR (l1= 0; r1)
dL2 (l1= 0; r1)| {z }
>0
dL2 (l1= 0; r1)
dLB (1)| {z }
<0
< 0.
In determining the sign of dv
B
R (l1=0;r1)
dLB(1)
I used the fact that:
dvBR (l1=0;r1)
dLB(1)
=
dvBR (l1=0;r1)
dL2 (l1=0;r1=0)
dL2 (l1=0;r1)
dLB(1)
and
dR2 (l1=0;r1)
dPr(x=0jl1=0) < 0 and
dPr(x1=0jl1=0)
dLB(1)
=
(1 L1 )(2pL 1)
(1+(1 L1 )LB(1))
2 > 0.
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2. an expert has always reputational incentives to declare against the her
perceived biased. By applying a monotonic transformation on vBR (l1 = 0; r1 = 0)
and using point 1. above we get
dRRB(l1;sR1 =0)
dLB(1)
< 0.
Putting everything together we get dCLRB
LB(1)
to be negative and as a result we can
conclude that dNBLRB
LB(1)
> 0 for any RB (0).
The fact that a bad expertnet current benet from lying is a strictly increasing
function in the probability of the counterpart lying for all possible own strategies of
the counterpart means that in the rst period the decision maker is more likely to
ignore an advice from the counterpart as it is tainted by the possibility of bias; this in
turn implies a higher weight on experts report and therefore a higher current payo¤.
At the same time the future reputation costs are the highest when the counterpart
probability of lying is close to 0 as the decision maker is able to compare the report
with a likely state.
Given the monotonic properties of the net current benet of lying with respect to
both own strategy and counterparts strategy we can now nd the way the optimal
strategies of the biased experts change with the parameters of the model.
5.1 Comparative statics with respect to the time preference
parameters
The change of a biased experts optimal strategy with respect to time preference
parameters, is determined by
dRB (0)
dRB
=  
det

dNBLRB
dRB
dNBLRB
dLB(1)
dNBLLB
dRB
dNBLLB
dLB(1)

det

dNBLRB
dRB(0)
dNBLRB
dLB(1)
dNBLLB
dRB(0)
dNBLLB
dLB(1)
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dRB (0)
dRB
=  
dNBLRB
dRB
dNBLLB
dLB(1)
dNBLRB
dRB(0)
dNBLLB
dLB(1)
  dNBLLB
dRB(0)
dNBLRB
dLB(1)
> 0
This is due to the fact that dNBLRB
dRB
> 0 as RB is just a positive transformation
on the expected future payment anddNBLLB
dLB(1)
< 0 (as proved earlier).
Also
dRB (0)
dLB
=  
det

dNBLRB
dRB(0)
dNBLRB
dLB
dNBLLB
dRB(0)
dNBLLB
dLB

det

dNBLRB
dRB(0)
dNBLRB
dLB(1)
dNBLLB
dRB(0)
dNBLLB
dLB(1)

Therefore
dRB (0)
dLB
=  
dNBLRB
dRB(0)
dNBLLB
dLB
dNBLRB
dRB(0)
dNBLLB
dLB(1)
  dNBLLB
dRB(0)
dNBLRB
dLB(1)
> 0
As dNBLLB
dLB
> 0 and dNBLRB
dRB(0)
< 0 by the same argument as above
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Chapter 3
Corporate Governance: A Double Layered Moral
Hazard
1 Introduction
In this paper, I propose a framework where an investor is aware of the existence of
di¤erent participants in a rm and the possibility of exploiting their existence for
increasing the chances of a projects success.
The starting point of this analysis is Tirole (2006) which classies corporate
governance literature into four strands based on how the management may not act
in the owners best interests: insu¢ cient e¤ort, extravagant investmentwhich
refers to the problem of empire building, entrenchment strategiesor actions that
hurt the owners but secure top executives in their position and last but not least, self
dealingwhen managers may increase their private benet from running the rm by
engaging in a wide variety of self dealing activities.These are all essentially moral
hazard problems. In this paper the focus is on self-dealing, which is traditionally
solved by compensating the manager su¢ ciently for not privately enjoying the funds
of the company. I show that this may not be the optimal incentive scheme in some
cases. Instead in certain conditions it is optimal to incentivize the manager to use
discretionary funds within the rm to motivate the employees to participate in the
success of the rm.
The novelty of this model lies in the new feature of self-dealing - usually in
contract theory self-dealing is treated exclusively as a problem (see Tirole 2006),
while in this model I show that allowing the manager to use some uncontractible
amount at his discretion might help the rm by encouraging greater e¤ort.
The manager has access to an uncontractible amount either because the rm
operates in di¤erent environments with di¤erent shareholder protection laws, or the
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size of the rm is large with many but small shareholders, or the nature of the
activity does not allow the investor to contract every possible action e.g. research
labs. Thus this amount can be interpreted as being characteristic to the nature of
the project or environment or both.
The manager may legally disburse funds under his discretionary control for
several di¤erent reasons. He may, for instance, pay higher than the typical market
compensation and perquisites to himself. Alternatively, he may pay higher wages to
his workers, spend on better working conditions for rms employees, also also on
infrastructure , e.g. research facilities, sponsorship of social activities for employees
(canteens, gyms, nurseries).
In return for sharing his private benets, the manager creates a work environment
which fosters cooperation, and overall higher e¢ ciency from all the participants in
the rm. This type of behavior is supported by Fehr, Gachter, and Kirchsteiger
(1997) which empirically show that there is a strong reciprocity between rms and
workers, and Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1998) which evidence reciprocal behavior
even between anonymously trading partners. Furthermore, Bandiera, Barankay
and Rasul (2007, 2009, 2011) demonstrate that working with friends can inuence
positively or negatively (based on the ability of the friends) an individuals produc-
tivity within a rm (in this case a fruit farm in UK) while Giuliano (2005) shows
that demographic di¤erences between managers and workers can inuence the rates
of dismissal and promotion of subordinates. Moreover Mas and Moretti (2009)
empirically show that individuals are motivated by social relations and mutual
monitoring, suggesting that working in a supportive environment can induce e¤ort,
when economic mechanisms are limited. So the extra e¤ort made by the employees
should not be interpreted as normal to the regular working contract.
Another motivation for this paper is the fact that managers may fail to follow
shareholdersobjectives not only in order to pursue their own enrichment, but also to
pursue the interests of the other employees of the rm. Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2003) show that when the corporate governance mechanisms like take-over threats
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have a limited e¤ect, the managers act both in their own interest and in the interest
of the workers: once a law that limits the threat of take-overs is introduced average
blue collar wage increases, total factor productivity declines and the return on capital
falls.
The corporate governance literature has analyzed self-dealing through several
examples: excessive compensation, managerial perquisites, transfer pricing or self-
serving nancial transactions such as personal loans to insiders, or even theft of
corporate assets. Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) look
at managerial consumption of perquisites due to lack of separation of ownership
and control, while Baumol (1959) and Jensen (1986) analyze over-investment by
management. The ability of the management to divert corporate wealth is discussed
in Grossman and Hart (1988), Hart (1995) and Zingales (1994). Many corporate
nance studies however, look at self dealing as a consequence of concentrated own-
ership with negative e¤ects on control. Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) have
provided a survey on this topic. This paper however is not motivated by the existence
of di¤erent forms of ownership and control, but on the ability of the manager to
divert companys funds.
As the ultimate goal of the owner is to make the manager use all the available
tools for achieving higher protability, however ignoring the relations between man-
ager and the rms employees may result in wrong incentives for managers. Thus,
this paper intends to provide a unifying framework in which managerial incentives
are impacted by both manager - shareholder and manager-employees relationships.
My model consists of two levels of moral hazard. The investor cannot contract
the amount of discretionary funds the manager will share with the workers. Secondly,
the manager cannot observe the actual exerted e¤ort and must condition payment
on the basis of an observed outcome. Here, we can see that the manager acts both as
an agent and as a principal simultaneously in two di¤erent subgames; it is necessary
to model this extra layer to recognize the existence of an environment consisting of
agents whose actions will have an impact on the success of the rm.
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The investor chooses not to run the rm himself and thus not to contract the
employees himself because he does not have the ability to do it or because the
ownership could be very disperse. Moreover even if the ownership is not disperse, as
Tirole again points out managers have proprietary information that often enables
them to get their way. So while shareholders have formal control over a number of
decisions, managers often have real control.Even nancial and regulatory rules -
in US in particular - deter investors (in general institutional ones) to sit in boards
due to the possibility of being penalized for inside information when re-selling the
shares of the company. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provide a survey of corporate
governance practices.
In terms of determining managerial compensation, I consider this in the stan-
dard sense of the well-known principal agent problems that arise from asymmetric
information. This paper may be seen as an extension of the standard principal
agent model to two layers of moral hazard with the manager being both an agent
for the investor and a principal for the employees. This is di¤erent from double
moral hazard problem where two economic actors are engaged in a joint production.
The double moral hazard problem was identied, dened and further anal-
ysed by Lafontaine (1992), Romano (1994), Bhattacharya and Lafontaine (1995),
Maruyama, (2003) and represents a situation where the manager is both shareholder
and agent and thus reacting to two-sided incentives. This issue was captured in
di¤erent settings such as franchising relationships by Mathewson and Winter (1985),
Lal (1990), Roberts (1996), Lal, Park, and Kim (2000), or more generally in vertical
integration. Articles that have surveyed the theories of vertical integration are
Holmstrom and Roberts (1998), Whinston (2003), Gibbons (2005), and Lafontaine
and Slade (2007).
In this model, the problem I address is not related however to the fact that
the manager is both shareholder and agent which would be a direct application of
vertical integration to corporate governance. The problem here is related to correct
identication of all participants in the rm and designing the right incentives for
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the manager: a double layered moral hazard.
The next section sets up and solves the model, while Section 3 provides testable
predictions and discussions. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 The environment
An investor invests I in a project. The project has a veriable rate of return r at the
end of the period if the project is successful and the investor loses all the investment
if the project fails. The investor hires a manager to run the business, but he cannot
write a complete management contract due to the complex nature of the project.
As Tirole (2006) puts it there are in general four ways in which the management
may not act in the owners best interest: insu¢ cient e¤ort, extravagant investment,
entrenchment strategies and self dealing. These are all fundamentally issues of moral
hazard problem and there are situations in which rms could face at least two or
three of these issues, however for this model tractability reasons will consider only
the last one: self dealing.
Self dealing problem in this model takes the form of an amount B < I available
to the manager but not contractible for a specic task which the manager may choose
to spend on his personal welfare or any other discretionary project. The manager has
access to this uncontractible amount B either because the rm operates in di¤erent
environments with di¤erent shareholder protection laws, or the size of the rm is
large with many but small shareholders, or the structure of the rm gives high powers
to CEOs. It could also be the case that the nature of the activity does not allow the
investor to contract every possible action, for example research labs. Thus B can be
interpreted as being characteristic to the nature of the project/rm or environment
or both. The manager may legally disburse funds under his discretionary control
for several di¤erent reasons. He may, for instance, pay higher than the typical
market compensation and perquisites to himself. Alternatively, he may spend on
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better work conditions and higher wages for rms employees (Lenovos CEO Yang
Yuanqing shared $3.25 million of his bonus in 2013 with his employees), but also
on infrastructure (both productive and social), e.g. research facilities, sponsorship
of social activities both for employees (canteens, gyms, nurseries). Providing excep-
tional work environment triggers a reciprocal behavior from the employees. This
extra e¤ort is not ex-ante observable and hence not contractible.
This rst level of moral hazard between the investor and the manager is very
similar to that employed in Tirole (2001) and Holmstron and Tirole (1997). In these
studies, however the manager was compensated for not using B as private benet,
while in this model the manager will have incentive to use the funds for optimally
involving the rms employees in the success of the project.
The manager, thus has the ability to commit to share a portion of this amount
B, labelled BE; with other the employees. In turn, this payment will compensate
for exerting higher e¤ort N at cost c(N). The project is successful with probability
p (N) and fails with probability 1 p (N). The remaining part of B not shared with
the employees will be used by the manager for his own private enjoyment. The right
share of managerial private benet Bp and employeesbenet BE will be determined
optimally. The manager will face a trade-o¤ between higher probability of success
(implying a higher expected wage) combined with a lower private benet (due to
higher BE) and the combination of lower expected wage with higher private benet.
The employees e¤ort is unobservable, hence uncontractible. If the project is
successful the manager will be paid a wage w and the manager will pay the employees
BE while the remaining part of B; Bp will remain with the manager. If the project
fails the manager gets zero wage, does not pay anything and keeps the whole B to
himself. The minimum wage set to zero corresponds to allowing a limited liability
constraint on the manager.
This type of incentive set-up has been lately employed by di¤erent corporations
in order to attract the employees for the rms success. One of the latest example
is the case of the insurance company Prudential Financial which announced in
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February 2014 that 44,000 of its employees who do not normally participate in
equity compensation programs will receive a $1,300 bonus for helping the company
to attain its protability goal (Prudential Workers Get $57 Million as CEO Beats
Target, Bloomberg News Feb. 6, 2014). Regarding this action John Nadel, an
analyst at Sterne Agee and Leach commented that: rewarding the general, non-
executive-management, is a smart move [..] and has to go a long way towards further
solidifying morale and loyalty.
My model consists of two levels of moral hazard. First, the investor cannot
contract the amount of discretionary funds the manager will share with the workers.
Second, the manager cannot observe the actual number of e¤ort exerted by the
employees and must condition payment on the basis of an observed outcome. Here,
we can see that the manager acts both as an agent and as a principal simultaneously
in two di¤erent subgames; it is necessary to model this extra layer to recognize the
existence an environment consisting of agents whose actions will have an impact on
the success of the rm.
The set-up is a three players model with an investor, a manager and the employ-
ees of the rm and I restrain myself from issues of moral hazard in teams.
The total e¤ort of the employees determines a particular probability of success
p (N). This probability function p (N) could be scaled up by a constant p in order
to capture the success of the project when no e¤ort is exerted, BE = 0 and Bp = B,
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but without loss of generality I set this constant to zero. The e¤ort is exerted at a
cost c (N).
The investor, in this model, in turn, will maximize his expected return by setting
a wage for the manager that increases his incentive to o¤er more to the employees.
The game has a Stackelberg timing.
2.2 Optimal Contracts
2.2.1 First Best
First, I will look at the rst best case where both the amount available to the
manager B and the e¤ort level are contractible. The optimal e¤ort is straightforward
to calculate for a probability function p:R! [0; 1] twice di¤erentiable, concave and
increasing in N and a twice di¤erentiable (increasing and convex) cost function
c (N):
N = arg max
N
p (N) [I (1 + r)]  I   c (N) (1)
with rst order conditions:
@p (N) [I (1 + r)]
@N
=
@c (N)
@N
(2)
In this case the manager is left with nothing at his discretion and the investors
contracts the employees. However the compensation o¤ered to the employees has
no allocative rule. The employees receive a constant minimum pay in all states of
the world, which makes them exert e¤ort. This case however is hypothetical only as
the investor has no executive role in the rm. Next, I look at the allocative role of
the contracts (when both B and N are not contractible) o¤ered to the manager by
the investor and to the employees by the manager so that both the manager and the
investor achieve the highest possible payo¤s. In this process, the employees achieve
also higher than otherwise possible expected payo¤s.
84
2.2.2 Second Best (B and N non-contractible)
The investors optimal contracting problem under moral hazard:
max
w
p (N) [(I  B) (1 + r)  w]  I (3)
subject to:
1. individual rationality constraint for the manager:
(1  p (N))B + p (N)  w +B  BE  u (4)
or
B + p (N)
 
w  BE  u
2. incentive compatibility constraint which requires that the manager is opti-
mizing his payo¤. This would be the second stage moral hazard problem implied by
the manager - employee relationship.
The manager maximizes his expected payo¤ by o¤ering to the employees a
particular payment BE accounted towards their e¤ort. Thus, the managers - who
is the principal in this case - optimal contracting problem under moral hazard is:
max
BWB
(1  p (N))B + p (N)  w +B  BE or (5)
max
BWB
B + p (N)
 
w  BE (6)
subject to:
1. limited liability constraint for the employees:
BE  0
2. participation constraints for the employees:
p (N)BE   c (N)  0
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3. incentive compatibility constraint for the employees which states that the
e¤ort exerted maximize their private payo¤ net of their cost of e¤ort:
max
N
p (N)BE   c (N)
The time structure dened above imposes that a e¤ort gets exerted only if there
is a positive benet to be made i.e. BE > 0.
The optimal e¤ort, the managerial wage and the optimal share of the employees
benet are determined by solving the above problem by backward induction.
For an increasing and concave probability function p (N) and increasing and
convex cost function c (N), the optimal number of links N
 
BE

is determined by
the rst order condition:
@p (N)
@N
BE =
@c (N)
@N
(7)
The optimal compensation scheme can be determined by substituting the optimal
e¤ort obtained above into the optimization problem of the manager. Probability
of success of the project at the optimal e¤ort becomes a function of employees
compensation and will be denoted by P
 
BE

.
BE (w) = arg max
BEB
B + P
 
BE
  
w  BE (8)
The optimal employeescompensation is determined by the rst order condition:
@P
 
BE

@BE
 
w  BE  P  BE = 0 (9)
The above condition reects the relation between the amount that the manager
decides to share with the employees and his own salary earned when the project is
successful. Basically, if the manager distribute more out the discretionary amount
at his disposal he will need to be compensated more if the project is successful.
Through this incentive compatibility constraint, the manager e¤ectively says: I will
forgo a part of sure B in the favour of my employees if the investor will compensate
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me more when the project is realized.
Assuming an interior solution, the optimal managerial wage w will be determined
by substituting the optimal employeesbenet in investors optimization problem:
max
w
p
 
N
 
BE (w)

[(I  B) (1 + r)  w]  I (10)
such that individual rational constraint is satised.
The optimal wage w has to furthermore satisfy BE ( w)  B, otherwise the
maximum available fund available to the manager B is reached. When BE ( w) > B;
the bounded employeespayment has to be limited such that the it is not higher
than what it is available to the manager i.e. BE = B.
It is important to note that even thoughBE is restricted to the maximum amount
that the manager could spend, the relation implied by [9] still needs to be satised -
wage and employeesbenet have to be in a positive relation, otherwise the manager
will not distribute the amount B for the employees to exert e¤ort.
Summarizing the above results:
Proposition 9 The optimal contract between an investor, manager and social group
exists with the following features: the optimal e¤ort of the employee is characterized
by [7], the employeesbenet is characterized by [9] ;while the optimal wage contract
o¤ered to the manager is determined by [10 ]; the nal return on investment is
p
 
N

[(I  B) (1 + r)  w]  I:
In section 3 I provide an example which capture heterogeneous environments
with di¤erent optimal corporate governance set-ups.
2.2.3 Optimal Amount at Managers Disposal
If we address a more general question - in the sense that we allow the investor to
choose an optimal B which maximizes his prot - then the investor will maximize
his prot over both w and over B :
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max
w;B
p
 
N
 
BE (w)

[(I  B) (1 + r)  w]  I
such that managers individual rationality constraint is satised:
 
1  p  N  BE (w)B + p  N  BE (w)  w +B   BE  u
:
All the other constraints of the manager and the employee remain the same.
3 Predictions and discussions
Further I look at a tractable case when probability of success has the form: p (N) =
N and I assume a quadratic and separable cost of e¤ort for exerting e¤ort:
c (N) = m
(N)2
2
:
The parameter m captures the ease of exerting e¤ort by the employee. This could
be specic to the employee in terms of training, abilities or specic to the rm, or
the industry. At a more general level the cost of e¤ort could be characteristics to
di¤erent geographic community and could be due to di¤erent education systems,
literacy, cultural paths, social norms, ethnicity or even past patterns of migration
The next results describe di¤erent optimal contracts
 
w; Bp

- between an in-
vestor and his manager - and
 
BE; N

- between the manager and the employee - at
di¤erent levels of uncontractible amount available to the manager and various level
of cost of e¤ort.
Result 1 If 0 < B  I(1+r)
4m2 r 1 , the optimal contracts
 
w; Bp

and
 
BE; N

exist
and are characterized by the following:
a. the managerial compensation is set at w = B
2m
if u < B
2m
and managers
individual rationality constraint does not bind.
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b. the managerial compensation is set at w =
p
m2 (u+B) if u  B
2m
and his
individual rationality constraint binds.
c. the private managerial benet Bp is set at zero.
d. the employeesbenet is BE = B.
e. the optimal level of e¤ort is N = B
m
.
f. the investors payo¤:  = B
m

(I  B) (1 + r)  B
2m
  I:
We are now in a situation when the amount available to the manager is not very
high. We see that within this incentive structure, all managerial private benet is
sacriced for increasing the success of the project which further translates to higher
ex-post managerial benets. This is due to the fact the employees have the ability
of exerting higher e¤ort for increasing the rms success.
In terms of comparative statics, if the uncontractible amount - B - available to
the manager is small, by increasing it, more e¤ort is exerted; as a result employees
benet is higher. The managerial private benet is set at zero but the managerial
optimal compensation increases with B. This incentive scheme basically sets-up an
uncertain higher bonus for forgoing a certain private benet.
Result 2 If I  B > I(1+r)
4m2 r 1 , and
(I B)2(1+r)2
8m3
 B  u, the optimal contracts 
w; Bp

and
 
BE; N

exist and are characterized by the following:
a. the managerial wage is set up at w = [(I B)(1+r)]
2m
.
b. the private benet is Bp = B   [(I B)(1+r)]
4m2
:
c. the optimal employeesbenet is BE = [(I B)(1+r)]
4m2
.
d. the optimal level of e¤ort is N = [(I B)(1+r)]
4m3
:
e. the investors payo¤ is (I B)(1+r)(2m 1)
8m3
  I
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If the amount available to the manager is above a threshold, he will start
distributing a lower share to the employees. In this case both the wage and the
employeesbenet decrease with B while the private benet increases with B:
This result suggests that, when B exceeds a minimum threshold, increasing B
leads to a disparity in earnings of the manager vis à vis the benets shared with
employees- i.e. when more of the investment takes an uncontractible form, the
greater the inequality will be. The wage is set at lower levels but the manager is
compensated with higher personal benet. In other words, beyond a certain level,
the existence of B can no longer be exploited to incentivize the manager. This
high uncontractibility of B could be due to the nature of the ownership of the rm
(small and dispersed shareholders are less likely to get involved in the activity of
the manager), or even due to the nature of rms activity for example R&D centers
where it is not possible to contract due to the uncertainty of the activity. It may also
be an outcome of the legal environment, where regulations for accounting disclosure
are either less stringent or are poorly enforced or even the structure of the rm
where CEOs hold great executive powers.
The cost of e¤ort plays also an important role in this set up as lower cost
translates in higher compensation for the employees and lower private benet for
the manager while the investor is overall better-o¤.
Next I look at a situation when managers individual rationality constraint binds
and the manager needs to be compensated more to stay with the rm.
Result 3 If I  B  I(1+r)
4m2 r 1 , and
(I B)2(1+r)2
8m3
  B < u the optimal contracts 
w; Bp

and
 
BE; N

exist and are characterized by the following:
a. the managerial wage is set at w =
p
4m2 (u B)
b. the private benet is Bp = B  
p
(u B)
c. the total employeesbenet is BE =
p
(u B)
d. the optimal level of e¤ort is N =
p
(u B)
m
and
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e. the investors payo¤ is  =
p
(u B)
h
(I  B) (1 + r) p4m2 (u B)i  I
As before, after a threshold increasing B does not incetivize the exertion of
e¤ort and the manager keeps most of it in terms of private benet. Increasing B
translates here as well, in higher amounts transferred to the manager and lower
employeescompensation.
3.1 A possible interpretation of the model: the emergence
of di¤erent structures of corporate governance
It appears from this simplied example that the level of uncontractible amount
available to the manager and employeescost of exerting e¤ort are important factors
in determining the optimal nature of contract for the manager.
If the uncontractible portion of investment B is in a moderate region, or the cost
of e¤ort is low, this may lead to shared benets among employees and the manager.
Further we see lower level of inequality between the manager and the employees and
higher prots for the investors.
If either the uncontractible amount or the cost of exerting e¤ort is high we see
a higher disparity of earning between the manager and the employees. In this case
most of the benets are enjoyed by the manager.
Based on this simple model we could explain the emergence of di¤erent forms
of corporate governance across the world as di¤erent countries have di¤erent legal
systems which regulate the uncontractible usage of funds but also have di¤erent
organizational structures based on the employees participation in rms. For example
the US and UK systems of corporate governance focus on the owners best interests
while the corporate governance in Japan, Germany and France relates to employees
interests (but also of other stakeholders) rather than protability exclusively for the
owners. In Germany this type of governance is stipulated by the law with rms
employees being represented in the boards of directors. In Japan, however, the strict
social norms rather than the law impose stakeholders interests to be of foremost
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importance to the rms objectives. Based on my model one could argue that these
systems of governance are optimal from investorsperspectives given the specic cost
of exerting e¤ort by the employees. In particular this cost could be characteristics
to each region and could be due to di¤erent education systems, literacy, cultural
paths, social norms, ethnicity or even past patterns of migration .
As an illustration of the results in Section 3 we could analyze governance and
organizational structures in countries like Japan where rms are embedded in social
environments versus governance systems in more individualistic societies. When
describing the structure of Japanese organization Aoki (1990) suggests that rms
governance has a high impact on the e¢ cient allocation of resources. Furthermore,
Aoki identies the ethnic homogeneity of the Japanese domestic factorywhich in
my model could be interpreted as a low cost of exerting e¤ort as a crucial factor for
the development and e¤ectiveness Japanese corporations.
However, although the social environment could foster lower cost of e¤ort, if the
amount uncontractible available to the manager is too high, perhaps due to large
size of the rm or weak legal enforcement system, this model predicts high disparity
in earning between the management and the employees and stakeholders. Again we
see consistency with the Japanese governance systems, but in this case we look at
large corporations. In particular, when CEOs are given high powers without proper
means of control we observe that they are less accountable to both shareholders
and stakeholders even though the social environment fosters e¢ cient allocation of
resources.
The latest Japanese nancial scandals (i.e. Olympus scandal8 which concluded
in 2013 with three top executives being found guilty and imprisoned for falsifying
accounts to cover up losses of $1.7bn, or the latest dismissal of the top executive
of Mizuho Financial Group9, Japans second-largest lender, for o¤ering more than
$2 million in loans to people a¢ liated with organized crime), show that when
the size of the company becomes too large and there are not proper means of
8BBC News 3rd July 2013 Olympus scandal: Former executives sentenced.
9Reuters news, 23rd January 2014: Mizuho replaces core unit CEO after mob loan scandal.
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monitoring the boards, this type of governance could lead instead to losses. As
pointed out by Yashimori (1995) large listed corporations in Japan are legally
subject to two monitoring mechanisms: statutory auditors and independent certied
public accountants. Neither is functioning properly. [...] The root cause of the lack
of monitoring by the statutory auditors is that they are selected by the president
whom they are supposed to monitor. [...] 90% of the statutory auditors (in large
corporations) are indeed chosen by the president for perfunctory approval at the
shareholders meeting. To tackle this situation in June 2010, the Tokyo Stock
Exchange introduced a new rule that all listed companies must appoint at least
one independent outside director or a statutory auditor who is independent.
A di¤erent situation we might consider is when the costs of e¤ort is high or the
uncontractible amount is high then the manager will keep all the private benet for
himself. In this case, the investor might wish to design di¤erent incentive schemes
such that the manager uses the entire discretionary amount B to complement the
existing investment instead of sharing it with the employees or keeping for his own
use respectively. This would be just a simple model of moral hazard in which the
managers wage is set at high enough levels such that he has no incentives to deter B
from investment as in Tirole (2001). This form of governance is optimal in societies
characterized by a more individualistic approach of business such as US or UK.
Designing incentive schemes ignoring the social structure in which the company
operates (which the existing literature has done so far) might result however in
ine¢ cient allocation of resources than otherwise feasible. This is due not only to the
inability of using all the available resources but also to the design of wrong incentives
o¤ered to the manager in the form of inappropriate compensation which is too high
to incentivize him to look for alternative sources of increasing protability.
One could also argue that the set-up in this model is related with the concept
of stakeholder society where all the participants in the success of the rm are taken
into account when decisions are made. This concept originated and developed in the
management theory (Freeman 1984, Freeman and Evan 1990, Hillman and Keim,
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2001, Godfrey, 2005, Walsh, 2005). The importance of stakeholder inuence on
incentive in rms has also been recently recognized in economic studies through
Tirole 2001, Magill, Quinzii and Rochet 2013, and Allen, Carletti and Marquez
2013. Similarly to Yoshimori (1995) the model captures a positive relation between
rms e¢ ciency and the stakeholder approach of governance as ignoring important
participants in the rms success might translate in the wrong incentives for the
management.
4 Conclusion
This study attempts to model corporate governance as a situation where an investor
is aware of the existence of di¤erent participants and the possibility of exploiting
their existence for increasing the chances of a projects success. By corporate
governance I understand mechanisms through which managers are made to act in
the interest of shareholders.
The common approach to model corporate governance is through principal agent
models which could identify optimal compensation contracts for managers. In this
model I look at a particular example of the agency problem: self-dealing.
In the contract theory literature, self dealing is described as a circumstance
where a manager has access to uncontractible resources and needs therefore to be
compensated for not expropriating funds from the company. I extend this approach
by considering the existence of an extra organizational layer: the employees. The
employees help the rm run smoothly by exerting e¤ort. I argue that an agents
incentives at work are moderated by both his ability of performing his tasks but
also by the uncontractible amounts available in the rm. I look thus for the
optimal managerial compensation such that the manager is incentivized to use
private benets for making the employees to exert e¤ort. Self-dealing thus loses the
negative connotation from the current contracts literature and the manager shares
the private benets with the employees when he is o¤ered the right compensation
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I also add to the contract theory literature by extending the standard principal
agent model to two layers of moral hazard with one manager being both an agent
for the investor and a principal for the employees. This is di¤erent than the double
moral hazard problem where the shareholder is both principal and agent.
In section 3 I connect this model with the emergence of di¤erent corporate
governance system across the world and I argue that not only the availability
of uncontractible funds but also the cost of exerting e¤ort are determinants in
choosing di¤erent organizational structures. I argue that this cost of e¤ort is due to
fundamental di¤erences between societies - such as history, culture, or geography,
including ethnicity or past patterns of migration. This paper tries to go to a more
profound level and proposes one plausible set of mechanisms that relate social
and legal characteristics (cost of exerting e¤ort and availability of uncontractible
resources) to corporate governance and possibly other economic outcomes. This
characteristics in question need not be exogenous, but would play the role described
in the paper as long as they were su¢ ciently entrenched. In that sense, this is
not a dynamic model, but rather an attempt at reaching one level lower into more
fundamental sources of di¤erence between societies.
Although these characteristics are endogenous to varying degrees, I suggest
that they will help make cross-sectional comparisons across societies, and possibly
intertemporal comparisons for a given society. Indicators for such features may take
the form of di¤erences in ethnicity levels, but also legal structures and enforcement
quality, openness, democracy, and other such proxies for protection of property
rights, the rule of law, and factors that enable individuals to perform their jobs
better. There is a great body of literature that examines cross-sectional di¤erences
in economic outcomes of countries as a result of di¤erences in social and legal
characteristics, however, the precise mechanisms that underlie the processes assumed
in this literature that often refers to the term institutionsare not always clear.
For instance, if all agents were to act rationally given knowledge of the e¤ect
of institutions on economic well-being, there would be a great deal more rapid
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convergence in economic outcomes across the world - something we do not see. This
paper attempts a connection between the observed macroeconomic evidence about
quality of institutionsand further provides testable predictions about di¤erences
in corporate governance mechanisms and wage distributions in society. To a more
practical end along this line, it also o¤ers a basic policy framework for transna-
tional corporations in terms of setting the appropriate ratio of managerial wage to
managerial slackbased on the location of activity (cultural environment).
This model can apply to general conditions while the outcome in terms of
e¤ort exerted and benets shared are not forgone conclusions, but depends on
the interplay of regional characteristics. In other words heterogeneity in legal
and cultures di¤erences would play a central role in determining the governance
mechanisms and wage contracts o¤ered by investors.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. It follows directly from the properties of the probability function p:R! [0; 1]
twice di¤erentiable, concave and increasing inN and cost function c (N) as well twice
di¤erentiable, increasing and convex in N .
5.2 Proof of the results in section 3
We solve for the optimal contract by backward induction. The success function is
p (N) = N and cost function c (N) = m (N)
2
2
with m > 1
2
.
For p (N) = N the employeesmaximization problem is:
max
N
NBE  m(N)
2
2
which implies:
N =
BE
m
(11)
Substituting these optimal links into the probability function we get:
p (N) =
BE
m
The managers optimization problem becomes:
max
BWB
B +
BE
m
 
w  BE
Thus:
BE =
w
2m
This shows that there is a positive relation between managers wage and the
employeescompensation.
The condition for an interior solution for the employees compensation is BE < B
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or w < 2mB.
Now, the investor maximization problem becomes:
max
w
w
2m2
[(I  B) (1 + r)  w]  I
such that
B +
w
2m2
 
w  BE  u (12)
FOC:
[(I  B) (1 + r)]
2m2
=
w
m
Thus
w =
[(I  B) (1 + r)]
2m
and
BW =
[(I  B) (1 + r)]
4m2
Bp = B   [(I  B) (1 + r)]
4m2
There are two constraints that need to be veried:
1. BE  B, so in order to have indeed an interior solution for BE then
[(I B)(1+r)]
4m2
< B or
B >
I (1 + r)
4m2   r   1
Note that 4m2   1  r > 0 as long as m >
p
1+r
4
2. B + w
2m2
 
w  BW   u,so in order to have interior solution for w : w2 
4m2 (u+B) or (I B)
2(1+r)2
8m3
 B  u
If both of this conditions are satised investor payo¤ is:
 =
[(I  B) (1 + r)]
4m2

(I  B) (1 + r)  [(I  B) (1 + r)]
2m

  I
=
(I  B) (1 + r) (2m  1)
8m3
  I
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 is positive as long as
I[(1+r)(2m 1) 8m3]
8m3
> B (1 + r) (2m  1).
If now, constrains bind than the above results are the optimal contract and hence
Result 2.
If condition 1 fails then BE = B and w = B
2m
and the investors payo¤ is
 =
B
m

(I  B) (1 + r)  B
2m

  I
These results represent the optimal contract in Result 1.
If condition 2 fails but 1 is satised thenw =
p
4m2 (u B) andBE = p(u B).
and the investor payo¤ is:
 =
p
(u B)
h
(I  B) (1 + r) 
p
4m2 (u B)
i
  I
These results represent the optimal contract in Result 3.
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